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THE STRUGGLE AGAINST HATE CRIME:
MOVEMENT AT A CROSSROADS
TERRY A. MARONEY*
INTRODUCTION

Hate crime,' far from being an anomaly, has been a means of
maintaining dominant power relationships throughout United States
history.2 Hate crime may be defined as acts of violence motivated by
animus against persons and groups because of race, ethnicity, religion,
national origin or immigration status, gender, sexual orientation, disability (including, for example, HIV status), and age.3 Thus defined,
* I would like to thank Brendan Fay, Thomas Hilbink, James B. Jacobs, Leslie Kahn,
Jennifer Mason, Janet Prolman, Paul Schmidt, Jonathan Simon, the staff, volunteers, and
clients of the New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project (AVP), the students
of the New York University School of Law Institute for Law and Society, and all those who
agreed to be interviewed for this Note.
1 For purposes of this Note, the terms "hate crime," "bias crime," and "bias motivated
violence" are used interchangeably.
2 For example, the systematic extermination of Native Americans could be characterized as hate crime. See James B. Jacobs & Kimberly Potter, Hate Crime, Law & Identity
Politics (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 115-16, on file with the New York University
Law Review) (detailing extent of organized campaigns of white violence against Native
Americans); James B. Jacobs & Jessica S. Henry, The Social Construction of a Hate Crime
Epidemic, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 366, 387-88 (1996) (same). But see Jacobs &
Potter, supra (manuscript at 43) (quoting legal director of University of Maryland's Center
for the Applied Study of Ethnoviolence as claiming that "[m]ass murder is mass murder;
it's not a hate crime").
3 This definition includes acts of personal violence, threats, intimidation, harassment,
or attacks against property motivated in part by such animus, as well as acts in which the
victim is merely perceived to be a member of the target group. This definition is broader
than many used in state and federal hate crime laws, see infra Part 11.B, in that it encompasses "immigration status" as a corollary of "national origin" and includes animus based
on gender, age, and sexual orientation. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. The
National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium has advocated for inclusion of immigration status in the definition, because persons who attack Asian Pacific Americans frequently invoke perceived immigration status. See National Asian Pacific Am. Legal
Consortium, 1995 Audit of Violence Against Asian Pacific Americans: The Consequences
of Intolerance in America 11-12, 26 (1996) [hereinafter Violence Against Asian Pacific
Americans 1995].
This definition does not include "hate speech," or words expressing animus without
any actual or clearly implied threat of violence. Such speech, however, often creates a
climate in which violence may flourish, whether committed by the speaker or by others
emboldened by such speech. See generally Group Defamation and Freedom of Speech:
The Relationship Between Language and Violence (Monroe H. Freedman & Eric M.
Freedman eds., 1995) (presenting collection of conference reports arguing that language
itself can be form of violence and that group defamation creates climate of hatred and
oppression); The Price We Pay: The Case Against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda, and
564
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the category encompasses a wide range of historical practices, such as

the many individual acts of violence against African Americans used
strategically to cement slavery's power base.4 Historically, such
crimes have been actively encouraged, passively condoned, or simply
ignored by systems of governance, especially the criminal justice system.5 For example, lynching, practiced disproportionately against
blacks, was for years an integral aspect of the administration
of crimi6
nal justice, one that was often officially sanctioned.
Pornography (Laura Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995) (noting social science data
demonstrating that hate speech promotes violence, discrimination, subordination, and degradation); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989) (arguing that widespread incidences of violence, vandalism, and harassment associated with hate speech call for legal sanctions). While significant First Amendment concerns have been raised in connection with efforts to control hate
speech, see generally The Price We Pay. The Case Against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda, and Pornography, supra (responding to claims that Frst Amendment protects hate
speech), those issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
4 See Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Antebellum South
171-91 (Vintage Books 1989) (1956) (describing range of physical abuses against slaves,
including jailing, placing in stocks, chaining and ironing, whipping, branding, mutilation,
shooting, and mauling with dogs). It is possible to argue that slavery itself was hate crime
on a massive scale. See Dictionary of Afro-American Slavery 615-21 (Randall M. Miller &
John David Smith eds., 1988) (pointing out that while "slavery as a legal status preceded
the use of race as a justification for exploitation," slave trade to Americas both relied upon
and solidified racist subordination of blacks). Once slavery was abolished, see U.S. Coast.
amend. XIII (abolishing slavery), organized hate groups and ad hoc coalitions of whites
began campaigns of terror against black communities in an attempt to freeze social and
political relations in a pre-Reconstruction tableau. Black communities that achieved political and economic independence from whites were frequent targets for attack. See Paul
Finkelman, Introduction, in Lynching, Racial Violence, and Law vii, vii (Paul Finkelman
ed., 1992) ("In the years after Reconstruction southern whites continued to use violence to
destroy black political power and to create and maintain a segregated society."). For example, in 1898 the multiracial political leadership of Wilmington, North Carolina was
ousted. Newspapers reported between seven and sixteen black deaths while one witness
claimed that at least 100 African Americans were killed. In the ensuing "economic coup"
whites took over black jobs and unions. No one was prosecuted. See generally H. Leon
Prather, Sr., We Have Taken A City. Wilmington Racial Massacre and Coup of 1898, at
119, 133-34, 173 (1984).
5 During and after slavery, for example, crimes committed by whites against African
Americans were not legally punishable, punishable at lower levels than comparable crimes
against whites, or ignored by authorities. See Dictionary of Afro-American Slavery, supra
note 4, at 396-97 (describing lenient or nonexistent criminal penalties for vhites who
harmed slaves); Marvin D. Free, Jr., African Americans and the Criminal Justice System
28-32 (1996) (discussing slave codes, lynching, post-Civil War "black codes," and frequent
violence against blacks); John A. Carpenter, Atrocities in the Reconstruction Period, in
Lynching, Racial Violence, and Law, supra note 4, at 32, 36-43 (detailing post-Civil War
racial violence as recounted in documents from that period, including contemporaneous
accounts of local authorities refusing to assist black victims or prosecute their assailants).
6 See Charles E. Owens, Looking Back Black, in Blacks and Criminal Justice 7, 12
(Charles E. Owens & Jimmy Bell eds., 1977) (reporting Tskegee Institute records revealing that 72% of lynching victims from 1882-1962 were black); see also Fmkelman,
supra note 4, at viii (describing lynching as form of "race control" and noting that anti-
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Examples of hate crime abound as well in recent U.S. history: the
murders of Emmett Till, 7 Medgar Evers, 8 and Vincent Chin;9 church
bombings and attacks on peaceful black protesters during the civil
rights movement of the 1960s; 10 and the white-supremacist-inspired
12
murders of Alan Berg, 1 Hattie Mae Cohens, and Brian Mock.
Much as hate crimes have persisted, so too has a clear pattern of differential administration of justice for minority victims. As late as the
1960s and into the 1980s, ill-trained police officers refused to document or investigate bias crime and even abused its victims. 13 Proseculynching legislation was blocked by Southern senators in 1930s); Jacobs & Potter, supra
note 2 (manuscript at 116-17) (discussing historic use of lynching against African
Americans).
7 Emmett Till, a 14-year-old African American boy from Chicago, was kidnapped and
shot in Mississippi in 1955 after he allegedly said "Bye, baby" to a white woman in a grocery store. The two white men accused of the murder were acquitted by an all white, all
male jury. See Juan Williams, Eyes On The Prize 39-57 (1987).
8 Medgar Evers, Mississippi leader of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP), was murdered in his driveway in 1963. Ironically, Evers had
been involved heavily with the Emmett Till case, personally finding witnesses and escorting
them out of town after their testimony. See id. at 46-52, 221-26.
9 Vincent Chin was a Chinese American murdered in 1982 in Detroit by white men
who mistakenly believed him to be Japanese; they blamed Japan for the decline of the
United States auto industry. See National Asian Pacific Am. Legal Consortium, 1994 Audit of Violence Against Asian Pacific Americans 6 (1995).
10 See Williams, supra note 7, at 179-95 (describing how, in 1963, Theophilius "Bull"
Connor, Commissioner of Public Safety, repeatedly ordered police to attack demonstrators-including children-with fire hoses and dogs); id. at 202 (recounting 1963 killing of
four little girls in bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham; on same day
two African American young men were killed in Birmingham, one by police and another
by group of whites).
11 Alan Berg, a Jewish radio talk show host in Denver, was murdered in his own driveway in 1984. Several members of Neo-Nazi groups were convicted of federal civil rights
charges for the murder. See Jack Levin & Jack McDevitt, Hate Crimes: The Rising Tide
of Bigotry and Bloodshed 1-5 (1993).
12

Hattie Mae Cohens, an African-American lesbian, and Brian Mock, a white disabled

gay man, were killed when the apartment they shared in Medford, Oregon was firebombed
by three white supremacist skinheads in 1992. The firebombing occurred at the height of
controversy over Proposition 9, a statewide ballot initiative that would have required wide-

spread antigay discrimination, leading many to conclude that the attack was motivated by
homophobia. It later appeared, however, that the Cohens and Mock were not the intended targets and that the firebombing was racially-motivated. See David Van Biema,

When White Makes Right, Tune, Aug. 9, 1993, at 40.
13 See Attorney General's Comm'n on Racial, Ethnic, Religious and Minority Violence, Calif. Dep't of Justice, Final Report 51 (1986) [hereinafter California Report] (call-

ing attention to lack of police training that results in "inadequate and inappropriate
responses that exacerbate community tensions"); Governor's Task Force on Bias-Related
Violence, N.Y. Division of Human Rights, Final Report 105-07 (1988) [hereinafter New

York State Report] (noting "disturbing" suggestion that bias crime "is ignored or not taken
seriously by law enforcement personnel, who may view these matters as 'pranks"'); National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs & N.Y. City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence

Project, Anti-Lesbian/Gay Violence in 1995, at 52-53 (1996) [hereinafter Anti-Lesbian/Gay
Violence in 1995

(citing national incident data which shows that, in cases where
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tors at worst undercharged, refused to charge, or encouraged leniency,
and at best failed to give the problem serious attention.14 Judges and
juries sabotaged prosecutions or sentenced hate criminals lightly rela5
tive to other criminals.'
In the 1980s and early 1990s, however, unprecedented public attention was focused on hate crime. State and local governments appointed commissions to study the issue;16 police departments and
17
prosecutors established specialized bias policies and procedures;
state legislatures, and later the federal government, debated and
passed hate crime laws in nearly every jurisdiction.1 8 Articles and

books on the topic were published in ever increasing numbers.19 The
issue even reached the Supreme Court, which heard and decided two

hate crime cases in quick succession. 20 In seemingly no time at all, a
homophobic violence was reported to police, 37% of victims classified police response as
"indifferent" and 8% as "abusive").
14 See New York State Report, supra note 13, at 148-49 (describing most prosecutors as
having no focused effort against hate crime and noting low prosecution rates); Tanya
Kateri Hernandez, Note, Bias Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the Prosecution of "Racially Motivated Violence," 99 Yale Li. 845, 852-53 (1990) (asserting that prosecutors do
not identify with bias victims or take their victimization seriously, are prone to see hate
crimes as pranks, and succumb to systemic pressures not to prosecute).
15 To give one prominent example, white supremacist Byron de la Becmith was convicted in 1994 of the 1963 murder of Medgar Evers; two white juries in the 1960s had
refused to convict. See Anti-Defamation League, Danger. Extremism, The Major Vehicles and Voices on America's Far-Right Fringe 5, 60 (1996) (describing eventual conviction
of de la Beckwith); Williams, supra note 7, at 221-25 (describing Evers murder); see also
Todd S. Purdum, Judge Says He Lied In Story of a Brother Slain In Bias Attack, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 7, 1997, at Al (describing 1963 racist murder of 13-year-old Virgil Ware in
Birmingham on same day Sixteenth Street Baptist Church was bombed; one white assailant confessed to murder, was convicted of manslaughter, sentenced to seven months probation, and released early); Panel to Examine Remarks by Judge on Homosexuals, N.Y.
Tunes, Dec. 21, 1988, at A16 (quoting Texas judge, who sentenced defendant to 30 years
rather than life for murdering two gay men, as saying he would "put prostitutes and gays at
about the same level" and that he would be "hard put to give someone life for killing a
prostitute").
16 See infra Part l.A (describing such commissions, their activities, and mandates).
17 See infra Part II.C (tracing development and content of such policies and
procedures).
18 See infra Part I.3 (describing state and federal laws targeting hate crime).
19 See AnnJanette Rosga, Policing Bigotry:. Socio-Legal Constructions of Hate Crime 8
& n.29 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation prospectus, Knox College) (on file with the
New York University Law Review) (discussing creation in 1990 of "hate crime" as subject
matter heading in Library of Congress to accommodate increase in publications on
subject).
20 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 479 (1993) (upholding state hate crime law
allowing sentence enhancement upon proof of bias motivation); RA.V.v. St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377,381 (1992) (invalidating city ordinance applied against cross burning as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination).
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"hate crimes jurisprudence" had sprung up.2 1 Violence that once was
tolerated increasingly was viewed as extraordinary, aberrant, and
intolerable. 22
Today, many would argue that the most egregious examples of
official tolerance of hate crime have become both more rare and taboo. Consider the following account of an exchange between a prosecutor and judge in 1988, after the murder of a gay Asian-American
man: "A Broward County, Florida circuit judge jokingly asked the
prosecuting attorney, 'That's a crime now, to beat up a homosexual?'
The prosecutor answered, 'Yes, sir. And it's also a crime to kill them.'
The judge replied, 'Times have really changed."'3
This Note argues that such an extraordinary amount of police,
legislative, judicial, scholarly, and community activity around hate
crime in such a short period of time-less than two decades-is the
result of an emerging social movement against hate crime. If, indeed,
"times have changed," such change is attributable to the rise and societal impact of a social movement dedicated to hate crime victims.
This Note further argues that this anti-hate-crime movement has been
rapidly assimilated into the institutions of criminal justice, with the
result that anti-hate-crime measures now reflect the culture and priorities of those institutions and therefore inadequately alter those institutions' treatment of hate crime and its victims.
Part I posits that the emergence and relative success of an antihate-crime movement, whose existence has not been described previously in the legal literature, is attributable to the civil rights and victims' rights movements. 24 Those movements created collective
beliefs, structural resources, and political opportunities that facilitated
the emergence of a social movement organized around hate crime and
its victims. Part II demonstrates the external impact of that movement by summarizing the explosion of government sponsored antihate-crime activity during the 1980s and 1990s. While most of the
legal literature on hate crime has focused on hate crime laws, such
laws represent but one aspect of a larger societal response that has
included government commissions, police and prosecutorial reform
21 See generally James B. Jacobs, The Emergence and Implications of American Hate
Crime Jurisprudence, 22 Israel Y.B. on Hum. Rts. 113 (1993) (discussing movement among
American states to criminalize and increase punishments for hate crimes).
22 Whether hate crime is actually increasing or is merely now regarded as less tolerable
is subject to debate. See infra note 88.
23 Valerie Jenness & Kendal Broad, Hate Crimes: New Social Movements and the Politics of Violence 50 (1997).
24 See id. at 21-48 (applying social movement theory to development of gay/lesbian and
women's anti-violence organizations and grounding those organizations in prior "rights"
movements).
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efforts, and social service provision. Part Im argues that governmental
adoption of anti-hate measures reflects the fact that such measures fit
easily into the values of a criminal justice system that remains
weighted against hate crime victims and their communities. This Part
uses narrative accounts to illustrate some of the problems regarding
how hate crime laws and policies are being implemented.2 By raising
doubts about the ability of current anti-hate efforts to achieve justice
for victims and their communities, this Part suggests that the antihate-crime movement is failing to achieve its central goal of systemic
transformation within criminal justice. The Note concludes that, to
achieve this goal, the anti-hate-crime movement must engage in critical self-reflection, invest in movement infrastructure, and recommit to
challenging the very institutions of criminal justice with which it now
cooperates.
I
THE EMERGING ANTi-HATE-CRIME MOVEM.ENT

Social movements have been, since the 1960s, the subject of considerable academic attention. 26 Broadly defined, a social movement is
the coming together of a group outside a society's established power
structure in an attempt to create or prevent social change.27 Within
these broad parameters, theorists have attempted to describe some of
the requirements for, and attributes of, social movements. Movements typically arise only at times when political and social factors are
conducive to their formation. 28 The mere existence of a grievance is
not enough; if political arrangements-for example, the existence of
both a totalitarian state and a demoralized populace-would necessar25 The author of this Note is the former HIV-Related Violence Program Coordinator at
the New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project. The narratives are drawn
from her personal experiences and observations, as weU as from interviews with others in
the field. Personal narrative increasingly is being used in legal literature, especially by
feminists and critical race theorists. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 3, at 2320 n.3 (recount-

hag author's personal experience of being victimized by anti-Asian hate speech); id. at
2322-24 (defining "outsider jurisprudence" as "jurisprudence derived from considering stories from the bottom" and asserting validity of reliance on "often ignored" sources such as
journals, oral histories, and life stories).
26 See, e.g., James L. Wood & Maurice Jackson, Social Movements: Development, Participation, and Dynamics 29-39 (1982) (discussing theories on social movements developed
in 1960s and 1970s).
27 See, e.g., Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action
and Politics 3-4 (1994) (defining movements as "collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and
authorities").
28 See id. at 17-18 (discussing "political opportunity structure" as determinative of
movement development); Wood & Jackson, supra note 26, at 42-43 (discussing "structural
conduciveness" requirement for movement development).
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ily frustrate collective challenge, no movement will arise. 29 If, however, political opportunities open the door to such challenges, a
movement may emerge. 30 Its emergence then depends on the extent
to which an identifiable grievance exists,3 1 the extent to which a consensus on its existence and problematic nature may be marshaled,3 2
and the presence of individual and organized group leadership capable of capturing and channeling mass energy and resources. 33
This Part argues that, though hate crime is far from new, a social
movement focused on its victims was able to emerge in the 1980s and
1990s. That movement may be traced to the social changes occasioned by two larger movements: civil rights and victims' rights. Each
made an undeniable impact on political and social relations in the
United States. Together, they created the conditions conducive to an
34
anti-hate-crime movement.

29 See Wood & Jackson, supra note 26, at 43 (discussing argument that democratic societies are inherently more structurally conducive to reform movement development than
totalitarian societies).
30 See Tarrow, supra note 27, at 17-18 (arguing that political opportunity structure is
main factor determining whether social movement will develop). This Note focuses primarily on political opportunity theory, not because other schools of social movement theory are inapplicable to an analysis of the anti-hate-crime movement, but because that
theory best explains the historical and political processes leading to that movement. For an
exploration of other schools of social movement theory, see generally Comparative Perspectives in Social Movements (Doug McAdam et al. eds, 1996) (discussing interaction
between political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes as factors influencing social movements); New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity (Enrique
Larafia et al. eds., 1994) (examining social movements from wide range of perspectives,
including broad views of social movement theory and specific national movements); John
Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements (1973) (discussing manner in which social movements arise, social conditions in which they are formed, and structures or behaviors common to social movements).
31 One theorist refers to this factor as "structural strain." Wood & Jackson, supra note
26, at 43 (citing Neil J. Smelser's definition of structural strain as "existence of ambiguities,
deprivations, tensions, conflicts, and discrepancies" from his groundbreaking 1963 work,

Theory of Collective Behavior).
32 See Tarrow, supra note 27, at 22-23 (describing process of "consensus mobilization");
Wood & Jackson, supra note 26, at 43 (describing Smelser's requirement of the "growth
and spread of generalized beliefs").
33 See Comparative Perspectives in Social Movements, supra note 30, at 3-4 (describing
resource mobilization theory and mobilizing structures); Tarrow, supra note 27, at 21 (arguing that mobilizing structures, such as "movement entrepreneurs" and "social movement
organizations or SMOs" are essential to movement formation); Wood & Jackson, supra
note 26, at 44 (discussing leadership as crucial aspect of "mobilization for action").
34 Cf. Jenness & Broad, supra note 23, at 23 ("The discursive themes emanating from
the 'rights' movements of the 1960s and 1970s formed the sociopolitical terrain that inspired and continues to fuel the contemporary movement to recognize, respond to, and
criminalize violence motivated by bigotry in the United States.").
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A.

PrecursorMovements

The victims' fights movement has profoundly influenced the development of criminal justice since the late 1960s, but has not-until
quite recently-focused its attentions on bias crime. Conversely, civil
rights movements on behalf of disenfranchised communities have always battled hate crime, but-prior to the 1980s-had not used the
language of victims' rights to fight the battle. The confluence of these
major social movements helps explain why, by the 1980s, a movement
on behalf of bias victims took hold.
1.

Civil Rights Movements

Civil rights groups typically have been organized in direct response to hate crimes against their communities and a perceived systemic bias against victims. The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith (ADL), for example, was founded in response to the 1913 prosecution and conviction of Leo Frank, a Georgia Jewish man accused
of murder who was later lynched. 5 Similarly, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was founded
in 1909 in response to racist lynchings and mob violence throughout
the country. 36 This relationship between hate crime and civil rights
organizing remains today 3 7 Once formed, nearly all civil rights organizations have placed the struggle against hate violence among their
central goals.
Bias crimes have also spurred mass mobilization on behalf of civil
rights. Hate crimes committed during the African American civil
rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s increased that community's
willingness to challenge racism in all its forms and mobilized support
on the part of non-black allies 3 8 Indeed, images of hate crime from
35 See Leonard Dinnerstein, The Leo Frank Case 156-57 (2d ed. 1937) (describing
founding of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) alter trial, which was widely
perceived by Jews to have been motivated by anti-Semitism).
36 See Langston Hughes, Fight For Freedom: The Story of the NAACP 20-23 (1962)
(describing founding of NAACP in response to 1908 Springfield, Illinois riot in which
blacks were lynched, injured, and driven from city, and their homes and businesses destroyed). In 1940 the NAACP created a separate organization, the NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund (NAACP LDF), to help victims of race riots. See Jack Greenbarg,
Crusaders In The Courts: How A Dedicated Band of Lawyers Fought for the Civil Rights
Revolution 19-23 (1994) (describing founding of NAACP LDF).
37 Consider that over 80 years after the founding of ADL and the NAACP, the 1990
bias-motivated murder of Julio Rivera, a Latino gay man, led to the revitalization of a gay
and lesbian liberation movement in Queens County, New York. See Interview with Ed
Sedarbaum, Founder, Queens Gays and Lesbians United, in New York, N.Y. (Nov. 17,
1997) (describing growth of movement in wake of Rivera murder).
38 See Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 118-19) (discussing violence against
blacks and Jews during 1950s and 1960s); Tarrow, supra note 27, at 130 ("The more violent
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that era, such as the burning cross and the burnt out church, remain
among the most potent cultural symbols of that age. 39 That era's martyrs-including Martin Luther King, Jr., Medgar Evers, and the four
young victims of the Birmingham Baptist Church bombing-still com40
mand a prominent place in our collective consciousness.
Newer movements, like that on behalf of gay and lesbian rights,
have attempted to gain societal recognition and legitimacy by calling
attention to similar incidents of violence. 41 Such incidents make vivid
the subordinated position of the gay community and mobilize some
measure of sympathy from an otherwise hostile society. Similarly, by
calling attention to anti-Asian violence, Asian Pacific Islanders are
able to challenge their community's frequent mischaracterization as a
"model minority" that experiences no racial biases or barriers. 42

These movements have borrowed strategy from one another, resulting in the development of a common "repertoire" of tactics, including demonstrations, hate crime incident audits, and lobbying for
legal change. 43 For example, from the time of its founding, the
NAACP's annual report contained a detailed report of the preceding
year's lynchings, described and catalogued by state of occurrence, race
of victim, alleged offense committed by victim, and method of killing.44 Given an eventual decline in lynchings, the NAACP stopped
and unchristian the behavior of white powerholders, the greater the moral superiority of
the students' tactics came to seem, and the more reasonable the movement's program.").
39 A wave of burnings of predominantly black churches in 1995 and 1996 refocused
national attention on racism and hate violence. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Old Fears and
New Hopes: Tale of Burned Black Church Goes Far Beyond Arson, N.Y. Times, July 21,
1996, at A12 (reporting racial tension in South where approximately 67 black churches had
been burned since 1995).
40 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. The recent release of the Spike Lee
movie, Four Little Girls, is evidence of the continuing cultural resonance of that incident.
See Four Little Girls (40 Acres and a Mule Productions 1997) (revisiting Birmingham
bombing and interviewing surviving family members).
41 See Jenness & Broad, supra note 23, at 70 (characterizing efforts to document and
publicize antigay violence as efforts to achieve "empirical credibility").
42 See Violence Against Asian Pacific Americans 1995, supra note 3, at 5 (declaring
documentation of violence crucial to ensuring that policymakers and others recognize magnitude of anti-Asian bigotry).
43 Tarrow has stated that movements create known repertoires of action which are borrowed both intramovement and outside of movement. See Tarrow, supra note 27, at 31-47.
Similarly, Jenness and Broad discuss the "appropriation of established collective action
frames" within and among movements, and propose that such borrowing occurs either via
direct social links or through a more generalized process of "cultural drift" in which later
actors assume the validity and viability of earlier movement actions. See Jenness & Broad,
supra note 23, at 177-78.
44 See, e.g., National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People, N.A.A.C.P. 24th
Annual Report for 1933, at 20-26 (1934) (reporting 28 known lynchings, compared to 10 in
1932, all but four against black victims, and including three committed as extralegal punishment for allegedly insulting white women).
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publishing its lynching audit, though its annual report continued to
feature incidents of racial violence. 45 Evidencing an appreciation for

the power of such reports, ADL in 1979 published its first tally of antiSemitic crimes, tracking nearly identical categories of information on
each incident.4s Much as the NAACP had used its reports in the early
1930s to lobby for state and federal anti-lynching bills,47 ADL used its
audits to lobby for adoption of a model hate crime statute 4s and passage of the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 199. 49 Similar audits were
later released by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force5 ° and the
National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium.51
By the 1980s, organizing against hate crime had come to be understood as both a catalyst for civil rights activity and a central focus
of civil rights movements. The image of the victimized individual and
the correspondingly victimized community was well established as a
symbol of the consequences of intolerance and bigotry. Much of that
symbol's cultural potency, and the reason it assumed such a central
role in civil rights activity, stemmed from an increasing societal recognition of crime victims and their rights and needs.
2.

Victims' Rights Movement

As the African American civil rights movement began to recede
in prominence, a potent new movement on behalf of crime victims
was coming to the fore.5 In 1968 Richard Nixon declared freedom
from violent crime to be "the first civil right of every American."53 By
1983, one commentator noted that "the so-called victims' movement
45 See, e.g., National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People, NAACP Annual
Report for 1971, at 25 (1972) (describing, among other incidents, bombing of NAACP
chapter president's home).
46 See Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Press Release of Anti-Semitic Incidents in 1979 (Dec. 8, 1979) (reporting unpublished audit showing 129 reported Anti-Semitic incidents nationwide).
47 See, e.g., National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People, supra note 44, at
21-22 (describing formation of Writer's League Against Lynching and introduction of federal anti-lynching law).
48 See infra notes 145-48.
49 Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (1994));
see infra note 179 (discussing passage of Act).
50 See, e.g., Anti-Lesbian/Gay Violence in 1995, supra note 13, at 6-7 (describing 19S5
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force report). Similar reports now are released annually
by the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, an association of gay and lesbian
anti-violence groups. See id.
51 See Violence Against Asian Pacific Americans 1995, supra note 3, at 1-2, 26-27 (recommending tougher hate crime statutes at state and local levels).
52 For a comprehensive treatment of the history of victims' rights, see generally Frank
J. Weed, Certainty of Justice: Reform in the Crime Victim Movement (1995).
53 Transcripts of Acceptance Speeches by Nixon and Agnew to the G.O.P. Convention,
N.Y. Tunes, Aug. 9, 1968, at A20.
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seems to be making faster progress than any previous civil rights
thrust in United States history.

' 54

The "discovery" of crime victims in the late 1960s was largely a
reaction to the Warren Court's expansion of defendants' rights.55 As
one self-described conservative scholar would later note in a subtitle,
"Anarchy And Lawlessness... Set The Tenor And Tone For A Victims' Rights Movement. '56 Social upheaval connected to the civil
rights struggle, therefore, led to a counter-movement that defined itself by association with victims of crime. 57
The victims' rights movement also was tied to the women's movement of the early 1970s. By drawing attention to the criminal justice
system's mistreatment of rape and domestic violence victims,5 8
women's rights advocates highlighted the problem of "secondary victimization" 59-abuse suffered by victims at the hands of police, prosecutors, social and medical service providers, and judges. 60
Women's focus on rape and domestic violence and conservatives'
reaction against the "due process revolution" coincided in one important aspect: outrage against both perpetrators of violence and a sys54 Curtis J. Sitomer, New Civil Rights Thrust: Aid for Victims, Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 5, 1983, at 1.
55 See Valiant R.W. Poliny, A Public Policy Analysis of the Emerging Victims' Rights
Movement 9 (1994) (claiming that "Warren Supreme Court decisions promoting defendants' rights" provoked "organizational battle-cries" on behalf of victims); Edward J. Van
Allen, Our Handcuffed Police: The Assault upon Law and Order in America and What
Can Be Done About It 13-22 (1968) (describing and criticizing Warren Court's expansion
of defendants' rights); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims' Rights
Movement, 3 Utah L. Rev. 517, 528 (1985) ("[S]upporters were reacting to the Warren
Court's expansion of defendants' rights.").
56 Poliny, supra note 55, at 17.
57 See id. at 9 (stating that "protest demonstrations[,]... [s]ocial unrest and blatant disrespect for order contributed to disenchantment with rehabilitation" and concern for
victims).
58 See, e.g., ABA, Section of Criminal Justice, The Victim Witness Assistance Project,
Victim/Witness Legislation: Considerations for Policymakers 63-71, 85-86 (1981) [hereinafter ABA Considerations] (describing legislative efforts to combat domestic violence and
advocating increased funding and attention to problem); Richard L. Aynes, Constitutional
Considerations: Government Responsibility and the Right Not to be a Victim, 11 Pepp. L.
Rev. 63, 64 (1984) (claiming that concern for victims "originated in modern times as a
result of the women's rights movement and its efforts to protect the welfare of rape victims"); Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action: An
Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 Pepp. L. Rev. 117, 118 & nn.4-5 (1984) (citing feminist concern for rape and domestic violence victims).
59 For an exhaustive listing of sources on secondary victimization, see Poliny, supra
note 55, at 34 n.48.
60 See, e.g., Jenness & Broad, supra note 23, at 26 (citing women's movement's central
focus on "challenging law enforcement practices that fail to intervene effectively to assist
injured women").
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tern that failed adequately to serve and protect victims. 61 This

convergence of interests, and its consequent mass appeal, has been
credited with the success of the movement. 62 As Wisconsin Supreme
Court Justice Shirley Abrahamson noted:
The call to recognize victims' rights comes from all points on the
political spectrum. It crosses party lines....
... [T]he victims' rights movement can engage the middle and
upper classes in the cause. The victim is no longer "only" a rape
victim or a minority or a poor person. The victim has become middle class America. We are all potential victims.6 3

Both radical and reformist demands 64 developed in response to
the widespread perception that the criminal justice system was "out of
balance" and insensitive to victims. 65 Reformist demands have enjoyed relative success; most states and municipalities, for example,
now provide money, social services, and special accommodations to
soften victims' encounters with police and courts 66.
61 See Emilio C. Viano, Victimology: A New Focus of Research and Practice, in The
Victimology Handbook: Research Findings, Treatment, and Public Policy xi, xi (Emilio C.
Viano ed., 1990) (crediting women's movement and "efforts undertaken after the urban
riots of the late 1960s" for development of victims' rights).
62 See Abrahamson, supra note 55, at 525-28 (discussing wide appeal of victims' rights
movement and possible reasons for its success).
63 Id. at 525-26.
64 See Emilio C. Viano, Task Force on Victims' Rights and the Justice System: A Background Document, in Victims' Rights and Legal Reforms: International Perspectives 337,
337 (Emilio C. Viano ed., 1991) (describing radical demands as "victims' rights" and reformist demands as "victims' needs").
65 See National Victim Center, 1989 Annual Report 18 (1989) ("While a person accused of a crime is surrounded by constitutional guarantees of his or her rights, the innocent victim of violence has few protections. The Center is leading a national effort to
correct this unfair imbalance in justice for all Americans."); Ronald Reagan, Preface, in
Crime Prevention Center, California Dep't of Justie .... And Justice For All: The Crime
Victims Handbook 3 (1981):
For most of the past thirty years, the administration of justice has been unreasonably tilted in favor of criminals and against their innocent victims. This
tragic era can fairly be described as a period when victims were forgotten and
crimes were ignored. We hope that things are now beginning to change for the
better.
66 See Abrahamson, supra note 55, at 548-58 (describing growth in victim compensation programs); David L. Roland, Progress in the Victim Reform Movement: No Longer
the "Forgotten Victim," 17 Pepp. L Rev. 35, 41-48 (1989) (same). Radical demands have
been less successful, though they continue to command popular support. These demands
have included a return to private prosecution, formal party status for victims within criminal proceedings, requiring victim input with plea bargaining, informing victims of court
dates and giving them the right to be present, and allowing victim impact statements at
sentencing and before parole boards. See ABA Considerations, supra note 58, at 25-27
(1981); Abrahamson, supra note 55, at 535-48; Roland, supra note 66, at 37-41, 48-57. Sev-
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Many victim programs were implemented during the 1970s as the
victims' rights movement gained a toehold in the criminal justice establishment and as private victim advocacy organizations became
more prominent. 67 It was during the 1980s, though, that-as two
prominent victim advocates put it-the "entire issue of victims rights
f This
was elevated to its proper place in the criminal justice system. 68
"elevation" has been credited to Ronald Reagan's Presidential Task
Force on Victims of Crime, which in 1983 released an influential Final
Report. 69 The report facilitated passage of major victims' rights legislation, including the Omnibus Victim and Witness Protection Act of
198270 and the Victims of Crime Act of 198471 (VOCA).
By the late 1980s, victims' rights provisions of some sort had been
adopted in every state,72 and the movement had permanently changed
the expectations of many crime victims for fair treatment at the hands
of the criminal justice system.

eral states have incorporated "Victims' Bills of Rights" into their constitutions. See, e.g.,
Cal. Const. art. I, § 28; Mich. Const. art. 1, § 24; R.I. Const. art. I, § 23.
67 In 1976 the American Bar Association established a Victims Committee in its Criminal Justice Section, and in 1979 it founded a Victim-Witness Assistance Project. See ABA
Considerations, supra note 58, at Foreword. By 1989, there were over 6000 victim assistance groups in the country. See Frank Carrington & George Nicholson, Victims' Rights:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come-Five Years Later: The Maturing of an Idea, 17 Pepp. L.
Rev. 1, 1, 14 (1989) (describing groups including National Organization for Victim Assistance, Victims' Assistance Legal Organization, and Parents of Murdered Children).
68 Frank Carrington & George Nicholson, The Victims' Movement: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come, 11 Pepp. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1984).
69 President's Task Force on the Victims of Crime, Final Report (1982). The Final Report made "some sixty specific recommendations for improving the plight of crime victims,
addressed to, inter alia, the federal and state governments, police, prosecutors, the judiciary, parole boards, hospitals, the Ministry, the Bar, schools, the mental health community,
and the private sector." Carrington & Nicholson, supra note 68, at 7-8 (describing Final
Report). By 1989, Congress had acted on 75% of those recommendations. See Carrington
& Nicholson, supra note 67, at 5. Among the Task Force's unsuccessful recommendations
was an amendment to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, creating
parallel rights for victims and defendants. See President's Task Force on Victims of Crime,
supra, at 114. The Victims' Constitutional Amendment Network (Victims' CAN) continues to advocate such an amendment to state constitutions. See Roland, supra note 66, at
40 & n.25.
70 Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515,
3579-3580 (1994) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2)) (allowing victims to seek restitution and
make victim impact statements, and protecting victims and witnesses from intimidation).
71 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10604
(1994)) (establishing, inter alia, Crime Victims Fund for state and local victim compensation and support services).
72 See Carrington & Nicholson, supra note 67, at 3-4 (discussing victims' rights provisions that since 1984 had been adopted by "the legislatures of every state").
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3. An Unlikely Combination Produces Unintended Consequences
The preceding overview suggests that the victims' rights and civil

rights movements would have little common ground from which an
anti-hate-crime movement could emerge. The victims' rights movement was in many respects a reaction against civil rights activity273
Accordingly, hate crime victims and their communities-a core constituency of civil rights movements-never have been a focus of the
victims' rights movement. 74
While victims' rights held out the promise of uniting disparate

communities through the common experience of victimization, 75 that
promise has not been realized. Though African Americans, for example, are more likely to be crime victims than whites, 76 it is the latter
group that has dominated the discourse on victims' rights. 77 Some victims' advocates have taken positions overtly hostile to people of color
and other potential victims of bias crime. 78 Those who are not overtly
hostile often have been insensitive to the backgrounds and needs of
bias victimS. 79 Civil rights advocates, for their part, have regarded victims' rights as a threat to hard-won social progress, particularly in the
area of defendants' ights.80 The two movements have taken directly
See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
In 1988, some two decades after the birth of victims' rights, the New York State
Governor's Task Force on Bias-Motivated Violence declared: "It is time for the renaissance of concern and support for crime victims to specifically include the victims of biasrelated violence." New York State Report, supra note 13, at 3.
75 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
76 See, e.g., Free, supra note 5, at 16-20 (citing 1991 National Crime Victimization
Survey).
77 The majority of crime victims' groups either are or are perceived to be predominantly white. See Angela Y. Davis, Women, Culture, & Politics 43-45 (1989) (describing
"rarity" of African American participation in anti-rape movement); Kimberl Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241, 1242-43 (1991) (claiming that women of color are underrepresented in feminist anti-violence discourse); Interview with Bryan A. Stevenson, Director, Equal Justice Initiative, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 14, 1997).
78 See, e.g., Poliny, supra note 55, at xvi-xvii (referring to assailants who attempted to
steal expensive watch as "Hispanic punks" and "human debris," and expressing desire to
hurl beer bottle at head of "lady judge" who sentenced assailants too lightly). This bias,
coupled with the reality that crime victims are disproportionately poor and people of color,
has led some to complain bitterly that ."the "war on crime" has been one of the few battles
in which the black community has not been enlisted."' Peter Kovler, Black on Black
Crime: A Taboo Broken, 223 Nation 390, 390 (1976) (quoting Robert W1"oodson of National Urban League).
79 See New York State Report, supra note 13, at ES2 & 13 (noting that victim service
staff may not be free from biases, recommending training to minimize racial, ethnic, language, culture, and sexual orientation barriers between victims and service providers, and
stating that "[flew victim programs make any special effort to include bias crime victims").
80 Civil rights groups have a long history of commitment to defendants' rights, given
biased enforcement of the criminal law and disproportionate arrest and conviction rates
73
74
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opposing positions on a number of issues, notably the death penalty,81
83
the "war on drugs," 82 and federal criminal sentencing guidelines.
That an anti-hate-crime movement did emerge from such seemingly opposing forces is a testament to the unintended consequences
that often flow from social movements. 84 Each movement had impressed its distinct story on the culture, preparing that culture to understand a combined narrative of criminal victimization motivated by
bias.
within their communities. See Greenberg, supra note 36, at 96-99, 440-60 (describing
NAACP LDF efforts on behalf of black defendants in areas of capital punishment, prisoners' rights, bail, jury discrimination, right to counsel, and forced confessions). This commitment stands in direct conflict to the stated goals of victims' rights advocates. See supra
note 55 and accompanying text.
81 See infra Part III.A.5 (discussing conflict over death sentencing of hate crime
offenders).
82 The National Victim Center publicly supports the government's "War on Drugs," see
National Victim Center, supra note 65, at 7, while many have asserted that the "War on
Drugs" victimizes poor and minority communities, see Robert Elias, Wars on Drugs as
Wars on Victims, in Victims' Rights and Legal Reforms: International Perspectives, supra
note 64, at 53; NAACP, Beyond the Rodney King Story: An Investigation of Police Conduct in Minority Communities 102 (1995) [hereinafter Beyond Rodney King] ("The 'war
on crime' and the 'war on drugs' have encouraged selective and racist law enforcement. In
the name of eradicating drugs, police have been given a free hand to harass, violate the
rights of, and brutalize minority groups. In the name of crime control, the police have
reduced all African Americans to criminals.").
83 The National Victim Center supported development of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. See National Victim Center, supra note 65, at 19 (citing goals of "swift, sure
and equitable justice for criminals"). Those guidelines have come under fire by civil rights
groups for imposing harsher sentences for crack cocaine offenses, disproportionately committed by people of color, than for powder cocaine offenses, disproportionately committed
by whites. See Reynolds Holding, Crack Case Penalties Are Upheld, Court Has No Power
to Ignore Guidelines, S.F. Chron., Dec. 14, 1996, at A3 (reporting that "civil rights groups
have long attacked the sentencing disparity as racially discriminatory"); Gordon Slovut,
Tough crack laws aren't working, 'U' study finds: lighter penalties advised, Minneapolis-St.
Paul Star-Trib., Nov. 20, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6937415 (stating that disparity in
prison penalties between crack and powdered cocaine is 100 to 1); Stephanie Stone, U.S.
Appeals Courts Still Turning Down Challenges to Crack Cocaine Sentencing Laws, West's
Legal News, 1996 WL 265206, May 20, 1996, at *1 (reporting that 88% of punished crack
offenders are African American). Several victims' rights groups filed amicus curiae briefs
in United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996), supporting the sentencing disparity
in spite of its racially disparate impact. See Brief of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation
in Support of Petitioner, available in 1995 WL 758774, at *18-*23 (No. 95-157) (arguing
that evidence that group of affected defendants are all of same race with no showing of any
comparison group of persons not prosecuted does not suffice to prove discriminatory prosecution); Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, Maryland Coalition Against Crime, Inc.,
Parents Association to Neutralize Drug and Alcohol Abuse, Inc., and Allied Educational
Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, available in 1995 WL 790420, at
*13-*16 (No. 95-157) ("Statistical Evidence of Racial Disparities is Insufficient as a Matter
of Law to Demonstrate Selective Prosecution").
84 See Tarrow, supra note 27, at 172 (suggesting that movements have "indirect and
long-term effects").
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B. An Anti-Hate-Crime Movement Emerges
The civil and victims' rights movements created the cultural conditions under which hate crime could be named as a specific form of
victimization. Similarly, the infrastructure put in place by those movements facilitated development of an anti-hate-crime movement sector.85 Those movements also created the political conditions
conducive to the emergence of an anti-hate-crime movement. Once
hate crime could be seen as a victims' issue, anti-hate efforts became a
politically palatable species of civil rights measure.86
1. Naming "Hate Crime" as a Social Problem
The first task of the anti-hate-crime movement was to create a
societal perception that hate crime was a specific evil requiring a specific response. 87 Civil rights movements had called attention to the
personal costs of minority groups' political victimization; the victims'
rights movement had called attention to the political context of personal victimization. Hate crime victims represented the site of overlap
between these movement stories. "Hate crime" thus became a resonant new diagnosis. An old problem was reformulated, and an old
class of victims acquired a new, specific subjectivity. Medgar Evers
and Vincent Chin could now be seen, not as political martyrs, but as
hate crime victims.
This new conception of hate crime as a distinct social problem
resulted in the spread throughout the 1980s of a generalized perception that hate crime was increasing.m While some commentators have
85 See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.

See Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 50) (arguing that concept of hate
crime "attempts to extend the civil rights paradigm into the world of crime and criminal
law").
87 As Tarrow describes this process:
Social movements are deeply involved in the work of 'naming' grievances, connecting them to other grievances and constructing larger frames of meaning
that will resonate with a population's cultural predispositions and communicate a uniform message to powerholders and others....
...[A movement] "has to develop a new diagnosis and remedy for existing forms of suffering, a diagnosis and remedy by which this suffering stands
morally condemned."
Tarrow, supra note 27, at 122 (quoting Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases
of Obedience and Revolt 88 (1978)). This process is also referred to as both "claims-making" and "framing." See Jenness & Broad, supra note 23, at 6-10 (describing processes
through which existing social conditions come to be interpreted as social problems).
88 Many commentators have asserted that hate crime, as an empirical matter, is increasing. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League, Hate Crimes Laws: A Comprehensive Guide 1
(1994) [hereinafter ADL, Hate Crime Laws] (arguing that hate crime is "widespread problem which is increasing steadily"); Governor's Task Force on Violence and Extremism,
State of Maryland, Executive Dep't, Final Report 3 (1987) [hereinafter Maryland Report]
86
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disputed whether hate crime did actually increase,8 9 the empirical validity of the claim is largely irrelevant; the perception that such crime
was both increasing and increasingly intolerable demonstrates the new
resonance of the movement's claim. 90
2. Development of a "Movement Sector"

The increasingly widely held view of hate crime as a problem mobilized the development of movement leadership. Much of the leadership for anti-hate efforts emerged from already established civil rights
groups. This included the ADL,9 1 the NAACP, 92 the Southern Poverty Law Center's Klanwatch Project, 93 the Center for Democratic
Renewal,94 the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium
(citing "rising tide of intimidation and bigotry" not peculiar to Maryland but "happening in
every state in the country"); Levin & McDevitt, supra note 11, at vii-xi (claiming that
"[o]ver the past few years, the number of attacks against people because of their race,
religion, sexual orientation or ethnic origin has increased at an alarming rate"); Hernandez, supra note 14, at 846 (citing "pervasive recognition that racially motivated violence
is on the rise"). Others assert that hate crime ebbs and flows in connection with political
and social factors. See Anti-Lesbian/Gay Violence in 1995, supra note 13, at 62-64 (arguing that antigay ballot initiatives in Colorado, Oregon, and Maine, national debate on
"gays in the military," and homophobic political rhetoric are directly correlated to increases in antigay violence); Violence Against Asian Pacific Americans 1994, supra note 9,
at 4 ("anti-Asian sentiment appears to occur in waves, reflecting foreign military action
and changes in immigration and economic conditions").
89 See, e.g., Jacobs & Henry, supra note 2, at 387-91 (calling assertion that hate crime is
increasing "ahistoric," given history of racial violence in United States, and claiming that
hate crime is merely perceived to be "epidemic" because society has come to regard such
violence as intolerable).
90 See Jenness & Broad, supra note 23, at 5-7 (discussing movements as mechanisms
through which people come to perceive and condemn social problems).
91 In addition to releasing an Annual Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents, see supra note 46
and accompanying text, ADL issued a model hate crime statute, see infra note 146 and
accompanying text, and throughout the 1980s broadened its focus to encompass various
types of bias crime, see Interview with Howie Katz, Associate Director, New York Regional Office, Anti-Defamation League, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 20, 1996). ADL has also
worked with a wide variety of government agencies and law enforcement officials, publishing an impressive array of studies, compilations, and advocacy pieces. See generally AntiDefamation League, supra note 15 (profiling rightwing extremist groups and their members); Anti-Defamation League & United States Conference of Mayors, Combating Hate
Crime in America's Cities: 1995 (1996) (reporting collaborative effort with local governments); ADL, Hate Crimes Laws, supra note 88 (presenting model statute and tracking
development of state hate crimes laws); Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Hate
Crimes: Policies and Procedures for Law Enforcement Agencies (1988) [hereinafter ADL,
Policies & Procedures] (presenting overview of desired and actual police policies regarding
hate crime).
92 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., Confronting America's Hate Crime Crisis, Klanwatch Intelligence Rep.
(Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, Ala.), Feb. 1992, at 6 (reporting Klanwatch
anti-hate-crime activities).
94 See Center for Democratic Renewal, When Hate Groups Come to Town: A Handbook of Effective Community Responses (2d ed. 1992) (outlining anti-hate strategies),
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(NAPALC), 95 the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force,9 6 the Puerto
Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, 97 and the Center for Constitutional Rights. 98 To a much lesser degree than its civil rights counterpart, the organized victims' rights sector began in the late 1980s to
devote attention to bias crime. For example, several victims' groups
joined the Hate Crimes Coalition, lobbying for a comprehensive antibias law in New York State.99
While already established organizations began to target hate
crime, new grassroots groups emerged with hate crime as their exclusive focus. Prominent examples of such organizations are the New
York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project (AVP), founded in
1980 after a rash of antigay attacks in a Manhattan neighborhood, 00
and the Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence (CAAAV), founded
in 1986.101 These and other grassroots anti-hate-crime groups 102 are
organizational hybrids, providing services traditionally associated with
victims' organizations-for example, counseling, support groups, and
crime victim compensation filing-as well as the lobbying, political activism, and legal advocacy associated with civil rights groups 0 3
95 NAPALC published its first audit of anti-Asian violence in 1993. See Violence
Against Asian Pacific Americans 1995, supra note 3, at 4, 18-24 (referring to 1993 report).
Other groups lobbying for recognition of anti-Asian crime included the National Democratic Council of Asian and Pacific Americans, the Japanese American Citizens League,
and the Asian American Bar Association of the Greater Bay Area. See Jacobs & Potter,
supra note 2 (manuscript at 98).
96 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
97 See Hernandez, supra note 14, at 845 (quoting 1987 testimony on anti-Latino bias
crime by Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund and citing that group's handling
of bias reports from Latino community).
98 See Hate Crimes Bill Coalition, List of Member Organizations (May 18, 1995) (on
fie with the New York University Law Review).

99 See id. (listing participation of Center for Battered Women's Legal Services, Downstate Coalition for Crime Victims, and Victim Services Agency).
100 See New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, HIV-Related Violence:
A Resource Manual for HIV Service Providers in New York City 11 (4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter HIV Manual].
101 See Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence, Police Violence in New York City's
Asian American Communities, 1986-1995, at 1 (1996) [hereinafter CAAAV, Police Violence] (describing CAAAV and its work); CAAAV Takes on Systemic Violence, CAAAV
Voice (Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence, New York, N.Y.), Spring 1995, at 1 (reporting anti-Asian incidents, with special focus on violence against South Asian livery cab
drivers); Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence, You Could Be A Victim of Anti-Asian
Violence [hereinafter CAAAV Pamphlet] (describing services, including translation, police
reporting and court assistance, and referrals) (on file with the New York University Law
Review).
102 See, e.g., Jenness & Broad, supra note 23, at 183-90 (listing grassroots anti-violence
programs for women, gay men, and lesbians).
103 See, e.g., CAAAV Pamphlet, supra note 101 (describing services and advocacy); HV
Manual, supra note 100, at 11 (stating that New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence
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The development of specialized organizations for hate crime victims was facilitated by the extensive infrastructure put in place by the
victims' rights movement. Many "special victim" programs had been
established in the 1970s to serve victim populations seen as particularly vulnerable, including children, the elderly, and victims of domestic violence and sexual assault. 1°4 As a result of movement advocacy,
hate crime victims were added to the special victim list, resulting in
the development of targeted programs and services. 10 5 Anti-hatecrime organizations were also able to draw on the funding sources
available to victims' groups. 10 6 Perhaps most importantly, the anti-

hate-crime movement inherited the victims' fights movement's focus
on secondary victimization. Anti-hate-crime efforts have mirrored
victims' rights measures that directly target the criminal justice system; perpetrators and potential perpetrators are not the primary
audience.
3.

Social Tension and PoliticalOpportunity
The anti-hate-crime movement also drew strength from the

continuing occurrence of hate crimes.' 0 7 Communities often were
propelled into action by specific crimes whose victims became potent
cultural symbols capable of mobilizing and focusing ongoing action.108
Once such cultural symbols were established, each subsequent hate
crime reawakened a deep reservoir of community sentiment and potential for action. These vivid reminders of subordination collided
Project currently provides victim services, activism, and advocacy on behalf of gay, lesbian,
and HIV-positive crime victims).
104 See ABA Considerations, supra note 58, at 59-76 (discussing establishment of special
programs for elderly and victims of domestic violence and rape); Abrahamson, supra note
55, at 525 & n.28 (describing special services for elderly).
105 See New York State Report, supra note 13, at 9 (citing "precedent for establishing
organizations, programs and service modules that emphasize type of crime or type of victim," such as domestic violence, sexual assault, children, and the elderly, to justify special
programs for bias victims).
106 See Jenness & Broad, supra note 23, at 52 (pointing out that Horizon's Anti-Violence Project in Chicago receives federal Victims of Crime Act funding through Illinois
Criminal Justice Information Authority); id. at 78-79 (explaining that New York City Gay
and Lesbian AVP's hotline was funded by the New York State Crime Victim's Board, and
that Gay and Lesbian Community Center of Colorado's Anti-Violence Project received
Victims of Crime Act and State Victim Assistance Law Enforcement grants to expand
services).
107 See Tarrow, supra note 27, at 38-39 (arguing that death, grief, and martyrdom are
powerful mobilizers); Wood & Jackson, supra note 26, at 43-44 (noting theory that once
generalized belief takes hold, "precipitating factors" challenging belief spur movements
into existence).
108 See, e.g., infra notes 127-28 (describing formation of anti-hate-crime commissions in
response to specific crimes); see also Tarrow, supra note 27, at 1 (noting that movements
have at their base cultural symbols through which social relations are understood).
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with society's desire to believe such subordination was extinct. Fur-

ther, the criminal justice system's perceived inability to handle such
crimes challenged the new ideal of a victim-centered society. 169 At
the same time, however, the country was becoming more politically

conservative and less willing to devote significant resources to promoting equality for disenfranchised groups. 110

Measures against hate crime emerged as a way for governmental
authorities to ease the tension between social desire and political real-

ity11 "Reform is most likely when challenges from outside the polity
provide a political incentive for elites within it to advance their own
policies and careers,"' 12 and calls to combat hate crime presented just
such an incentive. One commentator has asserted that hate crime
laws allow legislators to support a civil rights measure while simultaneously appearing "tough on crime."lu Because hate crime laws and
other anti-hate-crime measures fit easily into an anti-crime, pro-victim

agenda, supporting them became an effective way for political actors
to communicate a message of "caring" about disenfranchised communities without alienating conservative constituents.114 Constituents
have in turn interpreted their governments' willingness to adopt antihate measures as a gauge of their commitment to target communities.11 Such measures therefore became a powerful communication
109 Such clashes are an example of "structural strain." See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
110 See U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Pub. No. 77, Intimidation and Violence: Racial
and Religious Bigotry in America 13 (1983) (citing "widespread perception that the Federal Government is relaxing its enforcement posture in the area of civil rights and cutting
back on social programs" and noting "current shift toward a conservative political
philosophy").
111 See Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 140-42) (discussing political appeal
of hate crime laws).
112 Tarrow, supra note 27, at 98.
113 See David Chang, Beyond Uncompromising Positions: Hate Crimes Legislation and
the Common Ground Between Conservative Republicans and Gay Rights Advocates, 21
Fordham Urb. L.. 1097, 1098 (1994) (noting that hate crime laws further conservative
political agenda by furthering "law and order").
114 See S. Rep. No. 101-21, at 3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 158,160 (declaring that passage of Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990)
(codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (1994)), would "send an... important signal to
victimized groups everywhere that the U.S. Government is concerned about this type of
crime"); ADL, Policies & Procedures, supra note 91, at 1, 3 (noting risk of increased tension when "targeted group perceives that law enforcement officials are not taking the problem seriously" and suggesting establishment of hate crime reporting s)stem as "important
step which clearly demonstrates to the community that law enforcement officials have a
genuine interest in the problem of hate crimes").
115 Maryland's efforts are illustrative. In the early 1980s, that state took several measures targeting hate crime. A change in the citizenry's perception of the government's commitment to the issue quickly followed. See Survey Research Center, Ethnic, Racial and
Religioius [sic] Attitudes in Maryland, Survey I1, Report to the Governors Task Force on
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device between governments and the communities frequently targeted
by hate crime (target communities), one with few political
6
drawbacks."
Anti-hate-crime measures also had the political virtue of being
separable from other civil rights demands on the part of target communities." 7 This separation has been most evident in the context of
gay and lesbian rights and is reflected in the text of the Hate Crime
Statistics Act" 8 (HCSA). Conservatives upset with the inclusion of
sexual orientation, while unable to block HCSA's passage, did force
the inclusion of a "seeming non-sequitor [sic]"119 that disavows any
generalized support of homosexuality or gay civil rights.1 20 It is possible to support anti-hate-crime measures without supporting the more
controversial and resource-heavy demands of disenfranchised groups
Violence and Extremism (1986), reprinted in Maryland Report, supra note 88, at 26, 30
[hereinafter Survey Research Center, Survey II] (discussing state's adoption of anti-hatecrime measures in early 1980s). Compare Survey Research Center, Maryland Survey on
Violence and Extremism (1982), reprinted in Maryland Report, supra note 88, at 19, 21
(reporting results from 1982 Survey on Violence and Extremism, in which 41% of respondents indicated that federal government leaders did not care one way or the other about
hate crime and that 22% of state leaders did not care), with Survey Research Center, Survey II, supra, at 30 (identifying, by 1986, "notable drop in the perception that national
leaders didn't care"). The change in attitude was most significant among black respondents. In 1982, only 28.4% of black respondents felt that national leaders disapproved of
bias incidents, and 53.9% felt that state leaders disapproved. See id. at 34. In 1986, 51%
perceived that national leaders disapproved, and 70.6% felt that state leaders disapproved.
See id. The variation was less among white voters, a strong majority of whom perceived
government disapproval in both survey years. See id. at 29.
116 See Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 138) (claiming that "hate crime laws
are symbolic statements requested by advocacy groups for material and symbolic reasons
and provided by politicians for political reasons"); see also James B. Jacobs, Implementing
Hate Crime Legislation Symbolism and Crime Control, 1992-93 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 541,
543-46 (suggesting that symbolic laws, especially those "denouncing" universal evil such as
hatred, carry tremendous political weight at low cost, and claiming that "audience" for
legislators passing hate crimes laws is comprised of advocacy groups and their
constituents).
117 See Chang, supra note 113, at 1100 ("One can be antigay, yet still support the
criminalization of those who advocate antigay values through the vigilantism of hate-motivated assault."); Stephen Power, Groups rally for gay rights in Tyler: 150 protesters demand tougher hate-crime laws, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 19, 1995, at 33A (quoting
president of Dallas Gay and Lesbian Alliance as saying that though political climate "right
now is pretty much on the right... it should be pretty easy to get people on board for"
hate crime bill, though no such support could be garnered for extending benefits to samesex partners).
118 Pub. L. No. 101-275, § 2(a)-(b), 104 Stat. 140, 141 (1990) (codified in part at 28
U.S.C. § 534 note (1994)).
119 Jacobs, supra note 116, at 545.
120 See HCSA § 2(a)-(b), 104 Stat. at 141 (finding that "the American family life is the
foundation of American Society" and stating that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed,
nor shall any funds appropriated to carry out the purpose of the Act be used, to promote
or encourage homosexuality").
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for equality in housing, education, wealth, and sexual freedoms.1 2 1
Doing so allows government authorities to condemn the most extreme
manifestations of prejudice without committing to eradication of
lesser, more pervasive forms. 12 II

Two DECADES OF ANTI-HATE-CRmE Acrr-Tr
Because the anti-hate-crime movement has been supported by
both the civil rights and victims' rights movements, and because
change is most likely when "a system is challenged by a range of
movements, and not when individual movement organizations mount
challenges that can be easily repressed or isolated,"12 3 the movement
emerged as a powerful force. That this is so despite deep divisions
within the movement 24 is evidence of the strong cultural resonance of
the movement's claims and the political advantages of anti-hate measures. Anti-hate-crime measures flourished in the 1980s, a decade that
saw the passage of new hate crime laws in more than half the states,125
as well as an eruption of government commissions and reports,
changes in police policies, and founding of new organizations. Such
activity has continued throughout the 1990s.
A.

Local, State, and Federal Government Responses to Hate Crime

Throughout the 1980s, numerous states and municipalities established commissions to focus on bias crime, akin to President Reagan's
121

See Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 102) ("Passing laws denouncing

hate crime provides politicians with an opportunity to decry bigotry. They can propose

anti-hate-crime legislation as a quick-fix solution that is cheap and satisfying to important
groups of constituents.").
122 One legal advocate for hate crime victims has expressed discomfort with hate crime

laws on this basis. In her opinion, this phenomenon reflects a "hate the sin, love the sinner" attitude which ultimately erodes claims of right by that group. See Interview with A.
Widney Brown, FIlV-Related Violence Program Coordinator, New York City Gay and
Lesbian AVP, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 22, 1996).
M2 Tarrow, supra note 27, at 98.
12A

See infra III.B. (describing divisions and conflicts within the anti-hate-crime

movement).
25 ADL reported in 1992 that 46 states and the District of Columbia had enacted statutes addressing hate violence. See Anti-Defamation League & United States Conference
of Mayors, Addressing Racial and Ethnic Tensions: Combating Hate Crimes in America's

Cities 1 (1992). That figure, however, does not accurately reflect the boom in such legislation during the 1980s, as it included a wide variety of very old statutes, including laws

against "masking" and "nightriding." See infra note 143 and accompanying text. As of
1994, 35 states had enacted new hate crimes laws addressing interpersonal violence. See

ADL, Hate Crimes Laws, supra note 88, at 4-5, 7.
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Task Force on Victims of Crime. 2 6 These governmental bodies were
often formed in response to particular widely publicized incidents and

subsequent community mobilization. 2 7 In Maryland, for example,
the Governor established a special task force in response to an appeal
by the Coalition Opposed to Violence and Extremism (COVE)whose members included the NAACP, the Urban League, and the
National Conference of Christians and Jews-after a spate of hate
crimes.12 8

Such commissions generally were charged with gathering testimony from hate crime victims and their communities, evaluating the
ability of existing laws to address hate crime, assessing the adequacy
of victim services, and identifying needed changes to police procedures. 129 Government commissions therefore represented a crucial
dialogue point between the anti-hate-crime movement sector and its
constituent target communities, on the one hand, and systems of governance on the other.

Powerful and disturbing testimony elicited in such hearings led
commission members overwhelmingly to conclude that hate crime was
a significant problem not adequately addressed by police, prosecutors,
and service providers. 30 Accordingly, these commissions released a
series of recommendations that influenced the subsequent develop126 See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also James Bennet, Clinton Backs
Expanding Definition of a Hate Crime, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1997, at A20 (reporting on
recently convened White House Conference on Hate Crimes).
127 See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 90 (Feb. 6, 1987) (establishing New York State Governor's
Task Force on Bias-Related Violence in response to "several events in our state and other
regions"); California Report, supra note 13, at 3 (stating that Commission was established
in 1984 in response to more than five violent incidents); Mayor's Advisory Council on
Community Relations, Final Report 1-4 (1989) [hereinafter New York City Report] (reporting that New York City Mayor Edward I. Koch founded Council in response to murder
of Michael Griffith in Howard Beach incident).
128 See Maryland Report, supra note 88, at 3 (describing several incidents and noting
increase in Klan activity throughout nation).
129 See California Report, supra note 13, at 3 (stating that mandate of Commission was
to obtain accurate information on and develop standard definition of hate crime; to encourage implementation of measures to reduce hate crime; and to act as liaison to affected
communities); Maryland Report, supra note 88, at 5 (stating that Task Force's mission was
to determine extent of racial, religious, and ethnic bias in Maryland; to conduct public
education; to facilitate incident reporting; and to develop victim assistance programs); New
York City Report, supra note 127, at Ex. Sum.-1 (stating Council's mandate to review city
government's response to bias crime, to learn from perspectives of community leaders and
experts, and to recommend program improvements in field of intergroup relations); New
York State Report, supra note 13, at ES1 (stating mandate to hold public hearings, receive
information on bias crime, analyze existing governmental responses, and recommend appropriate educational programs, police training, and changes in law).
130 See, e.g., California Report, supra note 13, at 7 (finding that hate crime "poses a
threat to the peace and safety of our communities" and that "[e]xisting civil and criminal
laws fail to effectively protect the rights of hate violence victims").
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ment of law and policy. 13 1 The commissions thus served not only as
sites of dialogue, but as mechanisms through which the anti-hatecrime movement implemented its agenda of systemic reform. 132
While commission recommendations varied somewhat, they generally centered on improving bias victims' access to government serv1
ices,133 achieving greater coordination among those services, 3
establishing state hate crime laws, 135 and making existing laws more
comprehensive. 36 Additionally, the Maryland Governor's Task Force
131 See, e.g., Attorney General's Comm'n on Racial, Ethnic, Religious and Minority Violence, Implementation Task Force Progress Report 3-4 (1987) [hereinafter California Implementation] (noting state adoption of numerous Commission recommendations); U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights, Intimidation and Violence: Racial and Religious Bigotry in

America 19-21 (1983) (listing public commissions formed to combat hate crime and citing
claim that Rhode Island Coalition Against Bigotry was "instrumental" in passage of state
hate crime law).
132 See Tarrow, supra note 27, at 6 (arguing that social movements increasingly are
marked by states acting not only as targets of social movements but as fulcrums for claims
against others).
133 See, e.g., California Implementation, supra note 131, at 14 (recommending greater
access and describing, as examples of solution, workshop on hate crime organized by California Office of Criminal Justice Planning and pamphlet detailing resources for bias victims). The Commission also recommended passage of a Hate Violence Prevention and
Protection Act to establish and fund county Human Relations Centers to assist bias victis. See California Report, supra note 13, at 33-34. A year later, however, the committee
charged with evaluating implementation concluded that little headway had been made in
improving victim services. See California Implementation, supra note 131, at 14-15 (finding that "practical assistance and support services are still not being received by most victhms of hate crimes"); see also New York State Report, supra note 4 (calling for increase in
social services for hate crime victims).
43See New York City Report, supra note 127, at 12-17 (describing recommendation
that City establish coordinated interagency bias response mechanism and reporting
Mayor's creation of Bias Response Coordinating Committee in response); see also Exec.
Order No. 115, §§ 3-4 (establishing New York City Bias Response Coordinating Committee, comprised of officials from the Mayor's Office, Police Department, Board of Education, Community Assistance Unit, and Commission on Human Rights, as well as
"secondary members" such as Youth Bureau and Victims Services Agency), reprinted in
New York City Report, supra note 127, at App. 1.
135 See, e.g., Maryland Report, supra note 88, at 44-45 (discussing Task Force's recommendation that legislation defining harassment and providing relief for hate crime victims
be adopted); see also Md. Code Ann., art. 88B, §§ 9(b), 10(b) (1995) (requiring state to
"collect and analyze information relating to incidents apparently directed against an individual or.group because of the individual's or the group's race, religion, ethnicity, or sexual
orientation" and to report this information to the State Human Relations Commission).
136 The Maryland Governor's Task Force on Violence and Extremism was heavily involved in refinement and implementation of the first law in the country to mandate data
collection of hate crime. See Maryland Report, supra note 88, at 51-54 (reporting law and
Task Forces' involvement in its development). The California Attorney General's Commission on Racial, Ethnic, Religious and Minority Violence, which considered crimes
against gay men, lesbians, the disabled, and the elderly under the rubric of "minority,"
recommended amendments to the state's "Ralph Civil Rights Act." See California Report,
supra note 13, at 8; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7(a) (WVest Supp. 1998). That Act provides
that
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on Violence and Extremism commissioned two surveys of racial attitudes in Maryland, 137 convened the first conference on bias crime held
in the country, 138 and helped to found the National Institute Against
Prejudice and Violence (NIAPV), still in existence today.1 39

Commission recommendations were acted upon not only in their
respective states but also in others following their example. The
Maryland police guidelines for hate crime identification, for example,
which were developed in response to that state's data collection law,
were adopted by other states seeking to track such data. 140 Eventually, the FBI used state and local guidelines in developing compliance

All persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from
any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their
persons or property because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national
origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, or position in
a labor dispute, or because another person perceives them to have one or more
of those characteristics.
Id. For example, the Commission recommended increasing compensatory damages, granting trial priority to such suits, and bringing suits against law enforcement agencies that
engage in a pattern of violation. See California Report, supra note 13, at 7-9. It also
recommended amending the existing state penal law dealing with hate crimes to refer to
sexual orientation, disability, and age. See id. at 30. Many of these amendments were later
adopted. See California Implementation, supra note 131, at 11-12.
137 See Maryland Report, supra note 88, at 17-18 (explaining that Task Force commissioned study in 1981 to gather basic data and commissioned second study four years later
to observe changes in attitudes and to aid in making recommendations).
138 This conference was held in 1981 and was cosponsored by the Governor's Task Force
and the Coalition Opposed to Violence and Extremism (COVE), a private group. See
Maryland Report, supra note 88, at 85 (noting that conference drew 350 attendees from
throughout state). Subsequent conferences on hate crime were held for business leaders,
educators, and religious leaders. See id.
139 See Maryland Report, supra note 88, at 147-50. Finding that there was no comprehensive national resource to which governments and private organizations could turn when
formulating bias responses, Governor Harry Hughes-urged by the Task Force and with
approval of the National Governors' Association-asked the Maryland legislature for seed
money for a private, nonprofit clearinghouse centered at the University of Maryland. See
id. at 149-50. The National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence (NIAPV) held its first
national conference on bias crime in September, 1986. See id. at 150. Additionally, it has
published numerous influential booklets. See, e.g., National Institute Against Prejudice
and Violence, Striking Back at Bigotry: Remedies Under Federal and State Law for Violence Motivated by Racial, Religious, and Ethnic Prejudice (1986) [hereinafter NIAPV,
Striking Back]; National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence, Striking Back at Bigotry: Remedies Under Federal and State Law for Violence Motivated by Racial, Religious, and Ethnic Prejudice, 1988 Supplement (1988).
140 See ADL, Policies & Procedures, supra note 91, at 4-5 & n.2 (crediting Baltimore
County Police Department for proposed bias reporting guidelines in other states); Law
Enforcement/Uniform Crime Report, reprinted in Maryland Report, supra note 88, at 53
("These procedures, applauded throughout the nation, serve as a model throughout law
enforcement and are being replicated in other jurisdictions in the State of Maryland.").
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standards for HCSA. 141 Furthermore, in 1983, the United States
Commission on Civil Rights published Intimidation and Violence:
Racial and Religious Bigotry in America, a call to action that spurred
several states to examine their official treatment of hate crime and its
victimS.

142

While the mandates and recommendations of government commissions differed among jurisdictions, all urged self-reflection on the
part of government, especially with regard to the adequacy of laws,
policies, and services provided to victims of hate crime. The legislafive, police, and prosecutorial responses to that call are the subjects of
the following sections.
B. Hate Crime Laws
1. State Hate Crime Laws
Prior to 1980, numerous states had laws targeting hate crime,
many passed during the Reconstruction era to limit Ku Klux Klan activity. 143 Many states also had statutes prohibiting interference with
religious worship and vandalism of religious institutions. 144 No state,
however, had pursued a comprehensive approach to bias crime
through its penal code, and those statutes in existence were not regarded as part of any overall strategy to combat hate crime.
The concept of a comprehensive legislative response to bias crime
came into vogue in 1981 after ADL released a model hate crime statute "intended to assist state and local governments which would like
to enact hate crime laws. ' 145 The model statute represented the first
attempt to link disparate legal remedies-a separate substantive crime
141 See James B. Jacobs & Barry Eisler, The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990,29 Crim.
L. Bull. 99, 103-04 (1993) (noting that FBI's Uniform Crime Reports section surveyed 12
states and several cities with bias policies when formulating guidelines).

142

See generally U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 131 (expressing alarm over

rise of racially- and religiously-motivated crimes); U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Intimidation and Violence: Racial and Religious Bigotry in America, A Restatement (1990)
(describing responses of communities and public officials to rise in bias crime).
143 Anti-Klan laws are especially prevalent in the South, and they outlaw, for example,
the wearing of hoods, masks, or robes in public ("masking laws") and riding a horse at
night with the purpose of alarming or causing fear ("night riding laws"). See, e.g., Ga.
Code Ann. § 16-11-38 (1996); see also NIAPV, Striking Back, supra note 139, at 72-80
(giving comprehensive description and listing of such laws).
144

Although those laws cover crimes not motivated by bias, they generally are consid-

ered a type of bias crime law because they reach activity frequently motivated by bias. See

Anti-Defamation League, Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents 1993, at 1 (1994) (noting that
42% of anti-Semitic incidents reported involved property damage, primarily to synagogues
and Jewish cemeteries).
145

Anti-Defamation League's Model Legislation: A Primer for Action, in Bias Crime:

American Law Enforcement and Legal Responses 207 (Robert J. Kelly ed., 1993) [hereinafter ADL, Model Legislation].
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for institutional vandalism, penalty enhancement for crimes motivated
by certain biases, and a civil cause of action for bias victims-under a
common umbrella. 46 States soon followed ADL's lead, passing new
bias crime laws in record numbers, 147 over half of which were based

on the ADL model. 148 Additionally, because of increasing public attention to bias crime, states whose existing anti-bias laws previously
had been neglected-such as Massachusetts149 -began actively to pursue their exercise.
Notwithstanding the broad influence of the ADL model, hate
crime laws vary substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some
create separate substantive crimes when an enumerated underlying
crime is committed "because of" or "by reason of' a victim's characteristics. 50 Others establish penalty enhancements-to be considered
only at sentencing-when a defendant convicted of an enumerated
crime' 5 ' is found to have acted "because of" the victim's characteristic
or when the commission of that crime "evidences" or "demonstrates"
146 The model statute provides, in pertinent part, that a person is guilty of intimidation
when he or she violates specified preexisting criminal laws (e.g., laws against assault) by
reason of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation
of the victim. See ADL, Hate Crimes Laws, supra note 88, at 2-3 (reproducing model
statute in its entirety). The statute recommends a penalty enhancement for intimidation of
at least one step up from the penalty under the preexisting laws. See id. A person is guilty
of institutional vandalism for damaging a cemetery, religious structure or place, educational facility, or community center. See id. The statute also creates a civil cause of action
for persons suffering damages as a result of institutional vandalism or intimidation and
authorizes punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and parental liability for the actions of minors. See id. Finally, the statute mandates bias crime reporting by, and training of, law
enforcement officials. See id.
147 As of 1994, 35 states had enacted new hate crime laws addressing interpersonal violence. See ADL, Hate Crimes Laws, supra note 88, at 7.
148 See ADL, Model Legislation, supra note 145, at 206.
149 Massachusetts passed a comprehensive civil rights law in 1979. See 1979 Mass. Acts
801 (codified as amended at Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 11H-I; ch. 265, § 37 (1988)). It was
not until after the United States Commission on Civil Rights released its 1983 report on
bias violence, however, that Massachusetts turned its attention to making full use of the
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. See generally Massachusetts Advisory Comm. to the U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights, Stemming Violence and Intimidation through the Massachusetts
Civil Rights Act: A Summary Report December 1988 (1988) (providing overview of application and enforcement of Massachusetts Civil Rights Act).
150 See ADL, Hate Crimes Laws, supra note 88, at 8 (listing Iowa, Maryland, and North
Carolina statutes).
151 Statutes vary with respect to the enumerated predicate offenses that can trigger penalty enhancement. Compare Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.12 (1997) (allowing penalty enhancement for bias motivation upon conviction for menacing, aggravated menacing,
criminal damage or endangering, criminal mischief, and phone harassment), with D.C.
Code Ann. § 22-4001 (1996) (enumerating arson, assault, burglary, injury to property, kidnapping, manslaughter, murder, rape, robbery, theft, and unlawful entry as penalty-enhanced if bias-motivated).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

HATE CRIME

May 1998]

bias. 152 Additionally, some statutes mandate collection of hate crime
statistics, 5 3 establish training for law enforcement personnel, 1 4 and
create civil causes of action for hate crime victims.155 Still others,
modeled on federal criminal civil fights laws, criminalize interference
with the civil rights of another because of bias.1 6 Fmally, numerous
states criminalize interference with religious worship and vandalism of
religious institutions.15 7 In some cases, institutional vandalism laws
extend to nonreligious institutions identified with target groups. 15
Reflecting the conflict within the anti-hate-crime movement regarding the proper scope of anti-hate efforts, as 9 hate crime laws vary

widely in the types of bias they recognize and the classes of victims
they cover, leading to uneven levels of protection between jurisdictions. While all such statutes recognize bias based on the victim's
race, religion, or ethnicity, far fewer cover bias based on gender, disability, sexual orientation, or age. 160 Two states and the District of
Columbia recognize bias based on political affiliation. 161 The inclusion or exclusion of certain groups often has led to fierce legislative
debate, in some cases stalling passage of hate crime laws
completely. 162
152

See ADL, Hate Crimes Laws, supra note 88, at 9.

153 See id. at 30-31.

154 As of 1994, seven states (Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington) had training provisions in their hate crime statutes. See id. at
30-31, 38.
155 Hate crime victims, like all crime victims, may bring common law causes of action for
physical injury, emotional distress, and monetary losses. See NIAPV, Striking Back, supra
note 139, at 39-57 (detailing common law causes of action available to victims). The ADL
model statute, however, explicitly makes a civil cause of action available and provides for
punitive damages and attorneys' fees, and 22 states have incorporated a civil cause of action into their hate crimes laws. See ADL, Hate Crimes Laws, supra note 88, at 30-31, 3637.
156 See ADL, Hate Crimes Laws, supra note 88, at 8 (listing eight such statutes).
157 See id. at 33-35, 37 (listing "institutional vandalism statutes" and "interference with
religious worship" statutes).
158 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 939.645 (1996) (enhancing penalties for property damage committed because of "actor's belief or perception regarding the race, religion, color, disability,
sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of... the owner or occupant of that
property").
159 See infra Part IILB (discussing such conflict and suggesting solutions).
160 For a chart indicating which states include which types of bias, see ADL, Hate
Crimes Laws, supra note 88, at 30-31 (noting that 14 states recognized sexual orientation,
15 recognized gender, and 13 recognized disability).
161 See id. at 30 (listing Iowa and West Virginia).
162 The New York State bias bill provides an example. Since 1987, a proposed hate
crime law has died every year in the Republican dominated Senate because its Democratic
Assembly proponents have refused to eliminate its reference to sexual orientation. See
Interview with Howie Katz, supra note 91. Additional controversy broke out in 1992 over
the proper level of reference to gender bias. See id. The bill's popularity rallied briefly
after the 1994 shooting of a group of Jewish youths on the Brooklyn Bridge. See id. How-
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Those concerned with potential infringement on First Amend1 63
ment values have raised significant opposition to hate crime laws,
especially since the 1992 decision R.A.V. v. St. Paul,164 in which the
Supreme Court struck down a municipal ordinance criminalizing cross
burning. 165 While recognizing that cross burning constituted "fighting
words" which enjoy no constitutional protection, the Court held that
St. Paul could not selectively criminalize such speech based on its motivating bias, such as racism. 166 R.A.V sounded the death knell for
hate crime laws directly targeting speech and cast the constitutionality
of all hate crime laws into doubt.
The continued viability of penalty-enhancing laws was confirmed
one year later, however, in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.' 67 The Mitchell
Court unanimously approved the enhanced sentence given to a young
African American man convicted of aggravated battery for inciting an
attack on a young white man. 168 The Court reasoned that special
harms occasioned by hate crime-for example, the creation of fear in
the victim's community-could justify greater punishment.1 69 The
Court further pointed out that speech is often considered evidence of
motive and that many factors, including motive, are validly taken into
consideration in sentencing decisions; it therefore found the Wisconever, because it is still thought of as a "gay bill"-indeed, some legislators repeatedly confuse it with a pending gay civil rights bill-it has not passed. See id.
163 See, e.g., Susan Gellman, Hate Crime Laws are Thought Crime Laws, Ann. Surv.
Am. L. 509, 509 (1992-1993) (arguing that hate crime laws are "damaging to constitutional
values"); David Goldberger, Hate Crime Laws and Their Impact on the First Amendment,
1992-93 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 569,569 (arguing that advocates for hate crime laws inappropriately treat First Amendment concerns as obstacles).
164 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
165
166

See id. at 391.

See id. at 391-92. The Court quoted the invalidated ordinance:
"Whoever places on public property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika,
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code
§ 292.02 (1990)). The Court held that the ordinance constituted both "content discrimination" and "viewpoint discrimination," pointing out that identical conduct motivated by
"hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality-are not covered." Id. at 391.
167 508 U.S. 476 (1993). The statute unanimously upheld in Mitchell provides for penalty
enhancement when a person commits certain enumerated crimes and selects the victim or
the property damaged on the basis of race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin, or ancestry. See Wis. Stat. § 939.645(1)(b) (1996).
168 After watching the movie MississippiBurning, Mitchell asked his friends if they were
ready to "move on some white people" and, seeing the victim in the street, said: "There
goes a white boy; go get him." R.A.V., 508 U.S. at 479-80.
169 See id. at 487-88.
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led numersin statute constitutional. 170 Mitchell's stamp of approval
171

ous states to follow the penalty enhancement model.

2. FederalHate Crime Laws
The proliferation of state hate crime legislation has not been mirrored at the federal level. The primary federal tools for battling hate
crime remain criminal civil rights statutes, many of which were passed
in the Reconstruction era in an attempt to counter widespread violence against newly freed African Americans. 172 These laws are limited in scope, covering only violence motivated by biases against
groups whose civil rights are otherwise protected under federal law,
excluding, for example, homophobic violence.173 Additionally, as
suits under federal civil rights laws must be brought by the Department of Justice on behalf of victims, the statutes' remedies are unavailable in the vast majority of hate crime cases. 174
See id. at 487-90. The Court distinguished RAV. by pointing out that the St. Paul
ordinance was aimed at speech, while the Wisconsin statute was aimed at pure conduct and
would have no "chilling effect" on speech. See id. at 48748. Some scholars maintain,
however, that the case was wrongly decided. See, e.g., Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 316) (concluding that "the Supreme Court had it right in R.A.V and wrong in
Mitchell").
171 See, e.g., Memorandum, Governor's Program Bill 1 (1996) (on file with the New
York University Law Review) (noting that New York State's proposed hate crime bill as
introduced in 1996 was "patterned after model legislation drafted by the Anti-Defamation
League, the constitutionality of which was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
Wisconsin v. Mitchell").
172 See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1994) (criminalizing conspiracy to interfere with civil rights); id.
§ 242 (sanctioning deprivation of civil rights under color of law); 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1994)
(outlawing willful interference with sale, purchase, rental, financing, or occupation of any
dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin).
These statutes are discussed in detail in NIAPV, Striking Back, supra note 139, at 11-23.
The Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1994) (covering violence against persons
engaged in federally protected activities such as enrolling in school or registering to vote),
was passed in response to violence against African Americans asserting their civil rights.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
173 See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (1994) (prohibiting forcible interference only if motivated
by race, color, religion, or national origin); 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1994) (punishing only acts
motivated by race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin). But
see Bennet, supra note 126 (reporting proposal to expand statutes to include crimes committed against people because they are gay, lesbian, female, or disabled).
174 See Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 73-74) ("These statutes were never
intended, and have never served, as all-purpose federal hate crime statutes. Rather, they
function as insurance which can be called upon if, for discriminatory or other improper
reasons, state and local Iav enforcement officers fail to prosecute violations of civil
rights."). But see Bennet, supra note 126 (reporting announcement that President Clinton
will assign more federal hate crime investigators and prosecutors and establish working
groups on hate crime in U.S. Attorneys' offices); NIAPV, Striking Back, supra note 139, at
9-10, 161-69 (reporting that Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice brought
only 46 prosecutions for racial violence from 1980 to 1985, over half of which involved
Klan members).
170
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The last decade, however, has brought some notable developments in federal law. Foremost among these is the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990 (HCSA), 175 which authorized the Attorney General
to collect data from local police departments on enumerated crimes
that "manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual
orientation, or ethnicity."'1 76 Unlike the comprehensive hate crimes

laws passed by many states, HCSA is strictly limited to data collection
and carries few enforcement mechanisms. 77 Compliance with HCSA
remains entirely voluntary, and as of 1995 only eighty-five percent of
police departments in 172 surveyed cities reported such data. 78 Many
jurisdictions in official compliance consistently report zero hate
crimes.

179

Another notable development in federal law is a sentence enhancement for federal bias crimes, 180 implemented by the U.S. Sentencing Commission under direction of the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994.181 Also, gender-motivated violence
Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (1994)).
Id. § 2(b)(1), 104 Stat. at 140 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (1994)) (applying to
crimes of murder; non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault; simple
assault; intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage or vandalism of property). Those
crimes were chosen because federal data collection efforts already track such crimes. See
Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 76). The Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2131, (1994) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 534 note), amended HCSA to cover crimes motivated by the victim's disability.
177 See HCSA §§ 2(b)(2), (b)(4), (c), 104 Stat. at 140 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534 note
(1994)) (limiting Act's effectiveness to five years). The regulations were released by the
FBI, to whom the Attorney General had delegated responsibility. See Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Summary Reporting System, National Incident-Based
Reporting System, Hate Crime Data Collection Guidelines (1990) (containing regulations
written under authority delegated by Attorney General). HCSA was renewed recently
and now remains in effect indefinitely pursuant to the Church Arson Prevention Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-155, § 7, 110 Stat. 1392, 1394 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534
note (West Supp. 1997)).
178 See Anti-Defamation League & United States Conference of Mayors, Combating
Hate Crimes in America's Cities: 1995, at 1 (1996) (noting that many municipalities justify
nonreporting with statements such as "[w]e do not have that kind of problem in our City").
179 See id. at 3 (noting that one-fourth of survey cities responded that there was "no
problem at all").
180 See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Guidelines Manual 227 (1995). Section 3A1.1, "Hate
Crime Motivation or Vulnerable Victim," authorizes a three-level sentencing increase if
the "finder of fact at trial .. determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
intentionally selected any victim or any property... because of the actual or perceived
race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of
any person." Id. Because this enhancement is so new, any data on its use may not accurately reflect the incidence of bias crimes. See Telephone Interview with Michael
Coriander, Public Information Specialist, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Oct. 17, 1996).
181 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280003, 108 Stat. 1796, 2096 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 13701 note (1994)).
175

176
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may now be prosecuted under the Violence Against Women Act of
1994182 (VAWA).

Federal legislation, while limited when compared to the bold
strides taken by the states, has by no means been insignificant. 18
HCSA has had a particularly substantial impact. Although reporting
compliance is voluntary, the existence of the reporting mechanism and
the nationwide distribution of reporting guidelines has created incenfives for many police jurisdictions to collect uniform data on hate
crime. That and other steps taken by police to respond to bias crimes
are the subject of the following section.
C. Police and ProsecutorialResponses to Bias Crime

With increasing frequency after HCSA's passage, police forces
around the country began to establish specialized bias crime units and
to formalize differentiated intake and data collection procedures for
such crimes.' 84 Forces not establishing such units sometimes designated already existing departments to coordinate the force's response
to bias or to appoint bias crime "liaisons." 1 s While mandates varied
among jurisdictions, most bias units and liaisons collected data for
purposes of HCSA compliance, communicated with bias victims and
their community representatives, and officially labeled incidents as
bias-motivated. 186
While state and federal hate crime statutes often informed the
development of police procedures, in many cases police departments
182 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 StaL 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
18, 28, 42 U.S.C.). Jenness and Broad theorize that VAWA was passed in an effort to
remedy the exclusion of gender from most hate crime laws, and thus to put gender bias
crime on the same footing as other hate crimes. See Jenness & Broad, supra note 23, at
139-55 (discussing history of VAWA). In this manner, they demonstrate the complicated
interplay of movements: the women's movement heavily influenced victims' rights and,
consequently, the development of an anti-hate-crime movement; the anti-hate-crime movement was not inclusive of gender, advocates for women then crafted a women's rights law
fashioned after hate crime laws. See id.
183 Other recent federal initiatives include regulations issued by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development increasing civil penalties for hate crimes. See Michael
Janofsky, Blacks' Story of Harassment Is the Backdrop for New Frnes, N.Y. Tmes, Nov.
11, 1997, at A20 (reporting release of regulations).
184 See ADL, Policies & Procedures, supra note 91, at 3 (noting that several police bias
units were established in 1980s). In 1988, Abt Associates released an influential study
recommending the establishment of such specialized units. See Peter Finn & Taylor
McNeil, Abt Associates Inc., Bias Crime and the Criminal Justice Response: A Summary
Report Prepared for the National Criminal Justice Association (198S).
185 See, e.g., New York State Report, supra note 13, at 113 (recommending that small
forces in rural areas assign designated bias specialists and make use of preexisting
coordinators).
186 For an excellent collection of internal police documents establishing procedures for
handling bias crime, see ADL, Policies & Procedures, supra note 91, at 103-13.
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extended greater protections than mandated by such laws. 8

7

Addi-

tionally, some police jurisdictions had begun responding to bias crime
before being given a legislative command to do so and therefore were
188
able to advise the development of law.
To a far lesser degree than their police counterparts, prosecutors'
offices in several large cities have established Hate Crimes Bureaus or
similar Civil Rights Bureaus to handle hate crime, in some cases
before receiving a legislative directive.'8

9

Others have hired bias

crime victim-witness coordinators to assist victims and communicate
with community groups. 190 While such efforts remain scattered and
fledgling, their development was strongly advocated in a 1994 guide
developed by Cook County State's Attorney Jack O'Malley.191
Like government commissions, police forces sometimes have
formed community advisory councils to help fashion a bias response
plan, and advocacy groups have both lobbied police for desired
changes and participated in the design and delivery of bias training

187 For example, the New York City Police Department Bias Incident Investigation
Unit, founded in 1980 in response to synagogue vandalism, over time expanded its purview
from crimes based on race, religion, or ethnicity-the only categories mentioned in New
York State's bias crime law-to encompass the additional categories of sexual orientation
and disability. See Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 204-05); see also Hate
Crimes Against the Disabled to be Classified as Bias Crimes, Stop the Violence (New York
City Gay & Lesbian AVP), Summer 1993, at 1, 11 (reporting that sexual orientation was
added in 1984 and disability in 1993, both as result of advocacy by New York City Gay and
Lesbian AVP).
188 In Boston, for example, the Community Disorders Unit-expanded in 1978 to protect African Americans from attacks and harassment as they moved into previously allwhite neighborhoods-was instrumental in advocating for and implementing active enforcement of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. See Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 203-04) (describing development of Community Disorders Unit); Massachusetts
Advisory Comm. to the U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 149, at 6 (crediting Community Disorders Unit with development of successful implementation of Act).
189 The Kings County District Attorney's Office, for example, has a Civil Rights Bureau
even though New York State has only a limited bias crime law. The Civil Rights Bureau
regularly handles all types of hate crime, including antigay crime, that is not covered under
existing provisions. See Migdalia Maldonado, Practical Problems with Enforcing Hate
Crimes Legislation in New York, Ann. Surv. Am. L. 555, 555 & n.1. (1992-1993); see also
N.Y. Pen. Law § 240.30 (McKinney 1989) (defining misdemeanor crime of aggravated harassment as harassment motivated by racial, religious, or nationality bias).
190 The Cook County State's Attorney's Office employs two such specialists, in addition
to liaisons to the gay and lesbian, African American, Asian, and Latino communities. See
Telephone Interview with Ellen A. Meyers, Gay and Lesbian Liaison, Cook County State's
Attorney's Office (Nov. 7, 1996).
191 See Jack O'Malley, Cook County State's Attorney's Office, A Prosecutor's Guide to
Hate Crime (1994) (exploring history and context of hate crime laws, discussing relevant
case law, and detailing office's case handling procedures, courtroom strategies, and tips on
handling media).
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programs for police officers. 192 To a lesser degree, prosecutors have
engaged in dialogue with community groups and have sometimes
evinced a willingness to set up permanent mechanisms for such communication. 193 Police and prosecutors' bias crime units and reporting
mechanisms, like commissions, frequently exempt from their purview
crimes motivated by homophobia, gender bias, disability, and immi1 94
gration status.

A MovEMEiNT INSTITUTIONALIZED

Within the space of two decades, the anti-hate-crime movement

has achieved significant reform within institutions of governance. The
seeming "success" of the anti-hate-crime movement, however, deserves greater scrutiny. The fact that anti-hate measures have been
assimilated so easily into the very criminal justice system they seek to
challenge indicates that they fit squarely within its dominant ideol-

ogy.1-95 This raises serious questions about those measures' capacity
for changing that system. This Part argues that anti-hate-crime measures have come to reflect the internal culture of criminal justice more
than the priorities of the target communities such measures are meant
to benefit. The movement thereby has failed to bring about significant levels of actual change within the criminal justice system.
Movements are said to be "institutionalized" to the degree their
leadership, demands, and infrastructure have been brought within the
purview of society's dominant power structures. 196 Institutionalization is a typical stage in the life cycle of a movement. 197 Social move192 See Police Trainings In Staten Island, Stop the Violence (New York City Gay and
Lesbian AVP), Fall 1996, at 5 (describing trainings).
193 See Telephone Interview with Ellen A. Meyers, supra note 190 (describing such efforts in Chicago); Telephone Interview with Jennifer Rakowski, Hate Violence Client Advocate, Community United Against Violence (Oct. 21,1996) (describing such efforts in San
Francisco).
194 See, e.g., ADL, Policies & Procedures, supra note 91, at 63-64 (reprinting Interniational Association of Chiefs of Police model racial, religious, and ethnic violence policy);
Maryland Report, supra note 88, at 4-5 (limiting Task Force's scope to crimes aimed at
racial, ethnic, and religious groups).
195 See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L Rev. 1331, 1367 (1988)
("People can only demand change in ways that reflect the logic of the institutions they are
challenging. Demands for change that do not reflect... dominant ideology... will probably be ineffective.").
196 See Wood & Jackson, supra note 26, at 4-6 (defining institutionalization as holding
formal position of societal power and noting that many group actions fall on continuum
between polar types of institutionalized and non-institutionalized).
197 See Tarrow, supra note 27, at 141-45 (describing typical gravitation of movements
toward institutionalization and professionalization).
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ment theorists state that societies respond to social movements by
either repressing them or facilitating them; while repression may seem
the ordinary course, the "legitimization and institutionalization of collective action are often the most effective means of social control." 198
Facilitation is especially attractive if movement goals can be squared
with institutional ones. By being responsive, inviting movement leadership into decisionmaking structures, and implementing demands for
reform, governments can stave off larger confrontations and even stifle movement activity altogether. 199
Insofar as anti-hate measures have been assimilated into the formal power structures of lawmaking, police procedure, prosecutorial
power, and governmental policy, they have been institutionalized.
The movement behind those measures, therefore, has also experienced some degree of institutionalization. 200 This process is by no
means sinister. The anti-hate-crime movement organized, after all, in
order to see anti-hate efforts adopted by local, state, and federal authorities. It is undeniably true, however, that once "collective action
leads to outcomes in the sphere of politics,
the movements that
began the cycle can have less and less influence over its outcomes." 201
Movements that are not able to sustain collective action outside
spheres of political power eventually will cede control to those on the
inside. Anti-hate-crime efforts, once adopted, have come firmly
within the control of the legislators, government authorities, police,
prosecutors, and judges that shape and implement them. That institutional control, coupled with inadequate movement activity outside
those institutions, has frustrated larger attempts to alter systemic mistreatment of hate crime. This Part details some of the results of that
frustration, for two purposes: first, because these consequences are
the best evidence that institutionalization has occurred; and second,
because they lead to some suggestions as to how the anti-hate-crime
movement might respond.

Id. at 96.
199 See Wood & Jackson, supra note 26, at 44 (discussing influential early theorist Neil J.
Smelser's theory of facilitation as social control, often resulting in "co-optation" of
leadership).
200 Even those aspects of the anti-hate-crime movement which exist outside of governmental structures-such as grassroots groups-have been partially institutionalized, as
they now receive government grants, cooperate with police and prosecutors, and influence
the adoption of law and policy. See supra Part I.B.2.
201 Tarrow, supra note 27, at 25.
198
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The Consequences of Institutionalization: Insufficient Change
Within CriminalJustice

The case for attempting to alter the criminal justice system from
within is especially compelling in the hate crime context, given that
system's long history of disregard for such crime and abuse of its victims. As the many government commissions on hate crime concluded,
anti-hate efforts were considered necessary not only because potential
perpetrators thereby could be deterred, but because the criminal justice system had proved itself incapable of handling such crimes.202
This section discusses several examples of how, although the movement has succeeded in changing aspects of the criminal justice system,
that system nonetheless has retained aspects that motivated the movement's formation.
1. Inadequate Discretion Control
The anti-hate-crime movement has attempted to alter systemic
bias in part by installing discretion control mechanisms at critical junctures within the criminal justice process. 20 3 Police may not ignore hate
crimes because laws require them to report all possibly bias-motivated
crimes within a designated chain of command, 2 04 to collect and report
data on bias-motivated crimes,20 5 and to enter specific charges against
perpetrators who act out of bias.20 6 Statutes may bind prosecutors to
pursue bias charges in verified cases and may require judges to impose
specific sentences on those convicted of such charges 20 7 Thus, such
laws guide each stage of the criminal process to treat hate crime in
accordance with set rules, reducing systemic bias against its victims
and in favor of its perpetrators.
Bias mechanisms, however, are easily subverted and ignored, lessening their impact on institutional biases. In no context has an attack
202

See supra note 133 and accompanying text.

203

This is consistent with a broader push to eliminate the wide discretion historically

enjoyed by police, prosecutors, and judges. See generally Samuel E. Walker, Taming the

System: The Control of Discretion in Criminal Justice 1950-1990 (1993) (presenting theoretical overview of "discovery" of and attempts to control discretion within criminal justice

system).

204 See, e.g., HIV Manual, supra note 100, at 25-27 (describing New York Police Department requirements that patrol officers notify Precinct Commander or Captain of all cases
in which bias is suspected and that Commander or Captain inform Bias Unit of all cases
possibly motivated by bias and follow up on report within 10 days).
205 See supra Parts ILB.1 & II.B.2 (discussing data collection requirements).
206 See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing state statutes specifically applicable to hate

criminals).

207 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing separate substantive bias crimes and penalty-enhancement laws).
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on discretion led to its complete elimination,20 and anti-hate efforts
are no exception.
The processes by which police decide whether to label a given
crime as bias-motivated have been criticized for their fluidity and circularity. 20 9 While some commentators express alarm that police may
use fluid guidelines to declare any and all crimes bias-motivated,210 in
fact, whether acting out of personal bias, desire to avoid negative publicity, or not wanting to take on extra paperwork and investigation,
211 The
police have powerful incentives to undercount bias crimes.
clear perception on the part of target communities is that fluidity allows police unfettered power to avoid naming crimes bias212
motivated.
There is evidence that police do indeed avoid mandates by refusing to classify crimes as bias-motivated. 213 Though groups like AVP
208 See Walker, supra note 203, at 14-18 (suggesting that discretion cannot be abolished
but may be controlled).
209 See James B. Jacobs, Rethinking the War Against Hate Crimes: A New York City
Perspective, 11 Crim. Just. Ethics 55, 55-56 (1992) (describing New York Police Department Bias Unit classification guidelines as subjective and open to political manipulation).
210 See id. at 57 ("In short, the criteria are so loose and broad that practically any intergroup offense could plausibly be labeled a bias crime.").
211 See HIV Manual, supra note 100, at 25 ("These crimes are often ignored because of
the additional paperwork and victim contacts required, [and] the negative image attached
to precincts with high numbers of bias cases."); Aurelio Rojas, Turning A Blind Eye to
Hate Crimes, S.F. Chron., Oct. 22, 1996, at Al ("'The tendency is to pretend everything is
under control .. ."' (quoting Fred Persily, director of California Association of Human
Relations Organizations, citing police fear of unfavorable publicity as reason why few jurisdictions report hate crime)). The author of this Note once sat on a conference panel with a
high-ranking official from the NYPD Bias Incident Investigation Unit, who repeatedly defined his mission on the panel as one of reassuring audience members that bias crime rates
in New York City were extremely low and that hate crime was not a serious problem; he
cited his Unit's statistics as evidence of that supposedly low rate.
212 See HIV Manual, supra note 100, at 25-26 ("noting that "there is an institutional
slant against recognizing bias crimes," that "[t]hese crimes are often ignored[,J... many
bias crimes are never classified as such and never come under the more bias-sensitive purview of the Bias Unit" and that even though guidelines mandate "possible bias" classification when bias is suspected, "in practice, police continue to try to rule out any other
possible motivation for the crime"); supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing instances of zero reporting under HCSA).
A cartoon prominently displayed in AVP's offices reflects this perception. It shows
two police officers standing over the chalk outline of a dead body; behind them on the wall
are scrawled a swastika and the words "Die, faggot, die." One officer says to his superior,
"Other than robbery, sir, we're at a loss to determine a motive."
213 See Anti-Lesbian/Gay Violence Rises in New York City and Around Country in
1994, Stop the Violence (New York City Gay and Lesbian AVP), Winter/Spring 1995, at 1,
13 (reporting that nationwide community groups classified 4.67 crimes bias-motivated for
every crime thus classified by police); CAAAV, Police Violence, supra note 101, at 12 (reporting that because of racism or insensitivity, police refuse to classify anti-Asian crimes as
bias-motivated "even when bias motivation is clear"); Telephone Interview with Constance
Potter, Coordinator, Anti-Violence Program, Gay & Lesbian Community Action Council
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train victims to insist that police follow their own bias guidelines, that
power remains firmly vested in the police. An example of the
problems this creates is illustrative. 214 This author once accompanied
a victim-an HIV-positive Latino gay man-to his local precinct to
file a crime report. When giving his statement to the complaints officer, he stated that his assailant had called him an "AIDS faggot."
The officer would not write the words "AIDS faggot" on the report.
When the victim and his advocate insisted that he do so in order to
facilitate a Bias Unit referral, the officer expressed discomfort and
stated that he could be disciplined for using such language. The officer then consulted with nearby colleagues, each of whom agreed that
the epithet could not be included in the report. The resulting report,
therefore, gave no indication of the bias-related nature of the crime.
The Bias Unit referral was given eventually but only after the officer
demanded that the victim first disclose whether he was gay and had
AIDS. Such compelled disclosure was unnecessary, as the bias protocol specified that bias classification depends not on the victim's actual
characteristics but rather on the perpetrator's perception of those
characteristics,21 and was highly upsetting to the victim. The victim
later told his advocate that, had she not been present, he would have
walked out of the precinct as soon as conflict arose, or perhaps would
not have gone at all, out of fear of such police hostility.2 16 11-trained
(Oct. 11, 1996) (reporting that her group documented 418 homophobic crimes in previous
year as compared to 39 documented by police and citing police refusal to classify crimes as
bias-motivated as one main reason for discrepancy). This author personally has observed
numerous New York Police Department officers refuse to record a victim's allegation of
bias on crime reports; commanding officers refuse to call the designated bias unit; and the
bias unit refuse to attach the bias label, despite compelling evidence of bias.
214 This example, like many others cited in this Part, is based on the personal experiences of the author. See supra note 25.
215 See City of New York Police Department, Patrol Guide § 108-26 (1997) (defining
bias crime as "any offense or unlawful act that is motivated in whole or in part by a person's, a group's or a place's identification with a particular race, religion, ethnicity, sexual
orientation or disability"); Karen A. McLaughlin et al., National Bias Crime Training: For
Law Enforcement and Victim Assistance Professionals 38-41 (1994) (emphasizing that bias
classifications protocols are meant to apply when perpetrator mistakenly believes victim to
be member of target group).
216 See Anti-Lesbian!Gay Violence in 1995, supra note 13, at 49 (citing study showing
that many victims of homophobic violence refrain from reporting crimes out of fear of
police hostility, leading to low reporting rates relative to national reporting rates for all
crime); CAAAV, Police Violence, supra note 101, at 11-13 (claiming that police frequently
ignore or abuse victims of anti-Asian violence and reporting resulting unillingness on part
of such victims to file police reports); U.S Comm'n on Civil Rights, Intimidation and Violence: Racial and Religious Bigotry in America 7 (1990) (noting reports that Southeast
Asians and Latinos feel mistreated by police after suffering racial violence). Among other
consequences of nonreporting, victims who are deterred from filing police reports generally are ineligible for crime victim compensation benefits. See HIV Manual, supra note
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and insensitive officers remain the gatekeepers to subsequent services,
even in jurisdictions with highly developed bias units.217

Specialized bias units, both within police departments and prosecutors' offices, are intended to be additional guards against such biases. Within the units, it is presumed, systemic bias will be absent, and
hate crime mandates will be obeyed. This is particularly so if persons
within such units are given higher levels of hate crime training, and
even more so if they self-select out of a particular interest in hate
crime and sympathy for its victims. 218 The concentration of hate
crime knowledge in these units, however, may have the undesirable
counter-effect of eliminating the need for "ordinary" police and prosecutors to acquire such knowledge and consequent sensitivity.2 19 This
is especially problematic given that access to either type of specialized
unit depends, in practice, on identification and referral by the responding police officers and their immediate supervisors.
Even if a victim makes it through the hostile gates of police insensitivity, she must still contend with potential prosecutorial bias. If a
crime is presented to a prosecutor as bias-motivated, he or she still has
control over how it will be charged and tried. Indeed, prosecution
statistics suggest that the vast majority of cases in which bias is a factor
are not prosecuted at all, and that those which are prosecuted are infrequently charged under existing hate crimes statutes. 220 Prosecutors
100, at 54 (noting that New York State Crime Victim Board requires police report as prerequisite for compensation).
217 In an attempt to reduce such insensitivity, community groups have begun offering
trainings for police officers. See, e.g., Mayor's Police Council Re-Established, Stop the
Violence (New York City Gay and Lesbian AVP), Spring 1996, at 5 (reporting reestablishment of community-police council to coordinate training for police recruits); Police Trainings In Staten Island, supra note 192 (discussing precinct-based police training initiative).
218 See Telephone Interview with Scot Clark, Assistant District Attorney for the City
and County of San Francisco, Hate Crime Unit (Oct. 23, 1996) (describing Unit as staffed
by gay men, lesbians, and people of color who take hate crime seriously and personally);
Telephone Interview with Jennifer Rakowski, supra note 193 (claiming that hate crime
units attract sensitive people to police and prosecutorial jobs who would not otherwise
want those jobs); Telephone Interview with Woodrow Tennant, Sergeant/Inspector, San
Francisco Police Department (Oct. 11, 1996) (suggesting that, like domestic violence units,
hate crime units will transform those who work in them by repeatedly exposing them to
another group's reality).
219 See Telephone Interview with Woodrow Tennant, supra note 218 (claiming that there
is no contact between Hate Crimes Unit officers and other officers, meaning that "transformed" officer cannot influence "untransformed" ones and that hate crime is removed
from experiences of most officers).
220 See Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 214-17) (pointing out that little
information on prosecution rates is available and suggesting that hate crimes are seldom
prosecuted and hate crime laws seldom utilized); Rojas, supra note 211 (comparing high
rate of reported hate crimes in California with low rate of prosecutions). A disparity between police reports and prosecutions is standard for all crimes. To substantiate an allegation that hate crimes are underprosecuted relative to other crimes, one would have to
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continue to enjoy enormous amounts of discretion in charging, plea
bargaining, dropping cases, and making sentencing recommendations,
and courts consistently have refused to abridge that discretion in a
meaningful way.2 1 Decisions not to prosecute a crime as bias-motivated, potentially shaped by the prosecutor's own conscious or subconscious biases,222 generally cannot be challenged, except by political
protest.
Similarly, judges historically enjoy tremendous power over sentencing. 223 Although conviction for a substantive hate crime may
bump up the recommended sentence, in most state sentencing
schemes judges still operate within a range of possible sentences including jail terms, probation, parole, or rehabilitative programs.2 4
Hate crime laws that leave the consideration of bias to the sentencing
stage do not rein in judicial discretion at all, but merely add bias to the
list of factors that may be considered, actually increasing discretion.22

compare treatment of similar substantive crimes and take into account arrest rates. Given
the dearth of such data, this comparison would be extremely difficult at this time. Only
California currently collects prosecution statistics and has only collected such data for one
year. See Division of Criminal Justice Information Services, California Dep't of Justice,
Hate Crime in California 1995 (1996). Minnesota hoped to begin collecting prosecution
data in 1997. See Telephone Interview with I-.Camilla Nelson, Civil Rights Policy Director, State of Minnesota Office of the Attorney General (Oct. 31, 1996).
221 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 225-26 (1976) (,Vhite, J., concurring) (rejecting idea that prosecutorial discretion in seeking capital murder charge creates risk of
unfairness and stating that prosecutors will be assumed to exercise discretion properly);
Kenneth C. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 224-25 (1969) (describing
prosecutorial discretion as "unconfined, unstructured, and unchecked"); WVayne LaFave,
The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 Am.J. Comp. L.532, 532-39 (1970)
(describing extent of prosecutorial discretion, propriety of which is "clearly recognized in
the case law").
222 See Hernandez, supra note 14, at 851-55 (asserting that as result of subconscious
racism, even prosecutors acting in good faith discount minority victims and crimes against
them, resulting in chronic underprosecution of bias crimes; criticizing current hate crime
statutes for failing to address problem of underprosecution).
223 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,485 (1993) (citing tradition of sentencing judge considering wide variety of factors); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,71923 (1969) (noting that there are few checks on judicial sentencing discretion).
224 See ADL, Hate Crimes Laws, supra note 88, at 19-21 (describing rehabilitative sentencing programs in several states). Some members of target groups feel that, in some
circumstances, sentencing bias offenders to rehabilitative programs reflects continued judicial leniency toward bias criminals. See Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 22527) (noting existence of bias rehabilitation programs and claiming that some advocates
question their propriety, citing as example probationary placement of convicted
homophobic attacker in New York City Mayor's Office for the Lesbian and Gay Community, without office's consent and provoking community protest).
225 See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 485 (noting that Wisconsin statute simply added bias motivation to list of properly considered factors).
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Even in the face of compelling evidence of bias, judges may refuse to
22 6
acknowledge bias motivation.

In short, a biased police officer, prosecutor, or judge can always
find a way to evade the requirements of anti-hate-crime schemes.
More typically, insensitive or uneducated officers, prosecutors, and
judges may-despite such schemes-unconsciously act in ways that
alienate bias victims and undercount their experiences.
2.

Pull to the Paradigm Case and Resulting Suspicion of
Victim's Claims

Underprosecution and police undercounting are perhaps most
prevalent when bias was but one of several motivating factors behind
an incident. Both police and prosecutors routinely eliminate cases exhibiting mixed motives from the bias purview, even though many hate
crime laws and departmental protocols explicitly provide for inclusion
of such crimes. 227 Generally, prosecutors will try as bias crimes only
those cases in which the evidence of bias is overwhelming and the
victim highly sympathetic. 2 8 Exclusion of nonparadigmatic cases
often leads to sharp conflict with target communities, who perceive
those cases as hate crimes.22 9 Because the ultimate power to label or
prosecute a crime as bias-motivated lies within the criminal justice system, it will be police and prosecutors-not target communities or victims-who define those crimes23-0
226 See, e.g., Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 217-18) (recounting interview
with San Diego prosecutor who failed to obtain hate crime conviction of two white men
who "bound and gagged a Mexican farm worker, taped a sign to his head which read 'No
more here,' and dumped him in a field," as judge dismissed charges for "insufficient evidence" of bias).
227 See ADL, Policies & Procedures, supra note 91, at 39, 45, 61 (reproducing bias protocols that extend protection to crimes motivated in whole or in part by bias); New York
City Police Department, Patrol Guide, supra note 215, § 108-26 (defining bias crime as
motivated in whole or in part by bias).
28 See Telephone Interview with Constance Potter, supra note 213 (recounting incident
in which prosecutors were initially hesitant to charge as hate crime antigay crime in which
overt bias statements were made and swastikas were displayed, and commenting on general refusal to prosecute as hate crime any case where motive is mixed); Telephone Interview with Jennifer Rakowski, supra note 193 (describing Community United Against
Violence relationship with District Attorney's Hate Crimes Unit as highly cooperative and
productive, pointing out that Unit functions best with "most stereotypical cases" that will
"fly in court"). But see Telephone Interview with Scot Clark, supra note 218 (asserting
that while other cities may underprosecute out of desire to downplay tensions, San Francisco's hate crime prosecutors take broad view of bias).
229 See Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 206-11) (discussing frequent disputes between police and communities over labeling crimes bias-motivated).
230 See Anti-Lesbian/Gay Violence in 1995, supra note 13, at 55-58 (reporting that nationwide, only 40% of incidents reported-as bias are so classified by police and that in New
York City the figure is only 20%, claiming that changes in classification procedure in New
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This reductionist tendency is at least partially a function of the
fact that bias units are operated on a scarcity model. With limited
personnel, they cannot handle every case in which bias is a factor; in
order to control their own workloads, they will tend to focus on the
few paradigmatic cases. More profoundly, police may focus on extraordinary cases because they find them more exciting and professionally gratifying. l Rather than focus on the hate crimes most
likely to be experienced by the target communities they serve, police
may choose to focus on the hate group activities they find more
interesting

3 2

Given this systemic bias in favor of the extraordinary case, advocacy groups teach victims to insist that their cases be acknowledged as
bias-motivated 3 3 Because such insistence requires placing particular
emphasis on bias elements, however, victims are then open to accusations of distortion and false reporting.234
An example illuminates this point. 5 The head of the Kings
County District Attorney's Civil Rights Bureau was placed in charge
of a stabbing case because the victim stated that he thought he heard
an antigay epithet shouted immediately after he was stabbed by an
York City "sent a strong message that officers should be extremely cautious about labeling
an incident as bias-motivated," and asserting that "crimes exhibiting mixed motivation,
e.g., hate and economic, are almost never classified as bias").
231 For example, one researcher describes a recent police conference on hate crime
which focused almost exclusively on the Oklahoma City bombing, the far-right movement,
and organized terrorism, even though the speakers at that conference acknowledged that
the vast majority of hate crimes are committed by unaffiliated individuals. See
AnnJannette Rosga, Good Cop/Bad Cop: Refashioning Law Enforcement as the Thin
Blue Line Between Bigotry and Tolerance, in Homegrown Terrorism (Lucinda Cole &
Richard Schwartz eds., forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 1-3, 7-31, on file with the New
York University Law Review) (analyzing fourth annual conference on hate crime for police
officers, held in Maryland in May 1995). By focusing on militias and hate groups, the
mostly white, male, and heterosexual police officers were able to conceptualize themselves
as potential victims, while remaining unable to empathize with ordinary bias victims. See
id. (manuscript at 11). This empathy made them more invested in the extraordinary case.
See id. (manuscript at 1-2).
232 See id. (manuscript at 26) (reflecting on law enforcement conference and concluding
that "grass-roots activists involved in the struggle for the law enforcement recognition of
hate crime... have more or less disappeared from this production of the law enforcement
anti-hate-crime response. White masculine law enforcement emerged as both the subject
and object of this conference's proceedings.").
233 See, e.g., HIV Manual, supra note 100, at 25-27 (describing police procedures).
234 See Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 98-99) (arguing that significant
number of reported hate crimes are false and that media fail to report when alleged hate
crimes turn out to be hoaxes); Jacobs & Eisler, supra note 141, at 113-14 (claiming that
interest groups seeking "attention, access to funds, and political support" may contribute
to fraudulent and false reporting of bias crime); Maldonado, supra note 189, at 557 (positing that victims have strong incentives to fabricate bias motivation).
235 This account is based on the personal observations of the author, who was present
throughout the described events.
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unknown perpetrator.3 6 Police investigation indicated that a person
who looked like the victim had engaged in a drug deal with the suspected perpetrator. Because this prosecutor had come to believe that
many supposed hate crime victims either falsify or distort claims of
bias in order to gain "special treatment" or to hide their own criminal
activity,237 and because this case appeared to fit that "fraud" paradigm, she concluded that the victim-who, as it later appeared, may
have been a victim of mistaken identity-was lying. The victim then
was asked to a meeting in which three civil rights prosecutors and two
officers from the bias unit confronted him with accusations and
strongly urged him to confess to his involvement in a drug deal. The
victim, who knew that these unexpected allegations were untrue and
who was not allowed to consult in private with his advocate, was
highly traumatized. In the aftermath of this interrogation, his relationships with both the prosecutor and the police were irreparably
shattered. The prosecutor was eventually reassigned, though the police clung angrily to their "knowledge" of a fraud. The incident seriously damaged the working relationship between the advocacy
organization that supported the victim and both the Brooklyn District
Attorney and the Bias Unit.
As this incident suggests, a presumption of hoax threatens to
open wider rifts between police and prosecutors and target communities, rifts that anti-hate measures are meant to heal.
3. The Possibility of Selective Enforcement
Another reason police and prosecutorial discretion, bias, and suspicion of victims are problematic is the possibility that alleged bias
criminals disproportionately will be members of target communities.
Because hate crime laws and policies are neutral, referring only, for
example, to "race" and not to particular races, they can be used to
penalize bias-motivated crimes lacking historical pedigree.238 They
236 See Brendan Fay Stabbed in Williamsburg, Stop the Violence (New York City Gay
and Lesbian AVP), Fall 1993, at 4 (reporting stabbing and planned protest march).
237 See Maldonado, supra note 189, at 557 & n.6:
Given the heightened social awareness of bias crimes and the concomitant special attention that allegations of this sort receive from law enforcement officials
and the media, a complainant is keenly aware that if the crime perpetrated
against him or her is deemed a bias crime, he or she will be accorded special
protections, and the perpetrator will be dealt with more harshly by the courts.
A complainant, therefore, has an incentive to tailor his or her presentation of
facts so as to obtain a bias crime designation. This motive to embellish the
facts of a case not only serves to cast doubt on the credibility of some complainants, it also leads to a relatively high incidence of false reports.
238 One writer therefore has suggested that such laws be written to apply only to white
defendants whose victims are people of color. See Note, Combating Racial Violence: A
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can be invoked against an African American person who attacks a
white person, or against a gay person who attacks a heterosexual, even

though such crimes are neither the most common sort nor the kind
that spurred the development of anti-hate measures.P 9

Many civil rights advocates have expressed worries that such laws
will be used disproportionately against people of color.2 40 The American Civil Liberties Union, for example, called attention to the possibility of selective prosecution in its position paper approving of hate
crime laws, indicating that such approval could be withdrawn if over
time prosecutions were brought disproportionately against people of
color. 241
No empirical research has been done to support or refute the
premise of selective prosecution. Such research would be extremely
difficult, as only one state currently keeps statistics on hate crime
prosecutions, and those statistics provide only raw numbers, offering
no demographics on perpetrators. 242 Interviews with several hate
crime prosecutors suggest that such prosecutions currently are not being brought disproportionately against members of target communities 243 Anti-black hate crime appears to be the most commonly
Legislative Proposal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1270, 1272-74 (1988) (proposing special statutes to
punish interracial violence directed at minorities on grounds that such crimes represent
"most acute manifestation of the racial subjugation that has plagued American society,"
producing social harms not associated with interracial violence against non-minorities).
239 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Hate Crime Statistics 1995, at 7 (1996) [hereinafter Hate Crime
Statistics 1995] (reporting 1226 "Anti-White" crimes and 17 "Anti-Heterosexual" crimes
out of 7947 total incidents).
240 As one example of such concern, this author was called by the New York City Bar
Association's Civil Rights Committee for advice. Before recommending that the Association endorse a pending state bias bill, committee members wanted information an the frequency with which hate crime laws were invoked against people of color. See also Jacobs
& Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 31) (citing Jill Trigger, executive director of San
Francisco's Intergroup Clearinghouse on Hate Crime, as claiming that "white crime victims
are using hate crime laws to enhance penalties against minorities who already experience
prejudice within the criminal justice system"); Pedro Ponce, Some Question Use of Hate
Crime Laws by Victimized Whites, San Diego Union Trib., May 5,1994, at A36 (describing
use of hate crime laws in prosecution of minorities accused of crimes against whites).
241 See Interview with Bryan A. Stevenson, supra note 77 (explaining process by which
selective prosecution caveat was introduced into American Civil Liberties Union position
paper).
242 See California Dep't of Justice, Hate Crime In California 1995, supra note 220 (reporting incidents of hate crimes in California).
243 See Telephone Interview with Chuck Haines, Assistant District Attorney for City
and County of San Francisco (Oct. 15, 1996) (reporting that in 1995 Hate Crime Unit
handled 15 antigay crimes and six racist crimes; in 1994, five racist crimes, four
homophobic crimes, and one anti-Semitic crime; estimating that in early 1990s Unit handled approximately 30 antigay, 25 racist, and four anti-Semitic crimes); Telephone Interview with Ellen A. Meyers, supra note 190 (claiming that most hate crimes prosecuted in
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prosecuted, anti-Semitic and homophobic crime trail closely behind,
244
and other types of bias are prosecuted less frequently.
This cursory examination, however, does not dispose of the concern. Recent FBI statistics, based on local police reports, indicate disproportionate attention to hate crime against whites. According to
those statistics, in 1995, twenty-seven percent of known hate crime
perpetrators nationwide were African American, while fifty-nine percent were white,24 5 showing that blacks are significantly overrepresented and whites underrepresented as perpetrators in hate
crime reports to police.24 6 While these statistics indicate that crimes
perpetrated by whites are the most frequently reported, anti-white
crimes are being reported and bias-classified far more frequently than
the history of hate crime would suggest. Given both overt and unconscious racism or racial insensitivity on the part of police and prosecutors, it is reasonable to speculate that such persons are quicker to
think of anti-white crimes as bias-motivated than so to judge antiblack crimes. 247 Wisconsin v. Mitchell 248 arguably provides additional
evidence that hate crimes committed against whites may be regarded
as both more serious and more transgressive than crimes against people of color. One could argue that because Mitchell's victim was
white, 249 the case was considered sufficiently important to become the
vehicle for validating hate crimes laws.
Cook County are perpetrated against racial minorities, followed by anti-Semitic and
homophobic crimes).
244 See supra note 243.
245 See Hate Crime Statistics 1995, supra note 239, at 1. A total of 1023 persons of color
were labeled perpetrators of "Anti-White" crime, compared to 3167 whites who committed
racist crimes. See id. at 12. The white perpetrators committed 2208 anti-black, 34 antiNative American, 241 anti-Asian/Pacific Islander, 111 anti-multiracial, 404 anti-Hispanic,
and 169 anti-"Other Ethnicity/National Origin" crimes. See id. Similarly, 1990 New York
City police statistics cite 530 bias-classified crimes, of which 150 were anti-Semitic, 148 antiblack, 118 anti-white, 47 homophobic, 31 anti-Hispanic, and 22 anti-Asian. See Jacobs,
supra note 209, at 57 (citing official reports).
246 See Samuel Walker et al., The Color of Justice: Race, Ethnicity and Crime in
America 5 (1996) (citing 1990 census figures showing that African Americans comprised
12.1% of U.S. population while whites comprised 80.3%).
247 As one scholar has asserted, the criminal justice system is more likely to define Reginald Denny as a victim of hate crime than it is to think of Rodney King in those terms. See
Interview with Bryan A. Stevenson, supra note 77. Others claim that, as a normative matter, anti-white crime is increasing and that such crime should be given equal attention. See
Confronting America's Hate Crime Crisis, supra note 93, at 6 (asserting that black-onwhite hate crime is increasing); Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 286) (claiming
that "[w]hites, generally sympathetic to the aspirations of minorities, may bristle at the
suggestion that crimes motivated by blacks' racism against whites should be treated as a
less virulent strain of hate crime, or not as hate crime at all").
248 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
249

See id.
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More research is needed to ascertain the extent of potential disproportionate enforcement against historically oppressed groups.
Such a risk may not be dismissed easily.
4. Police brutality
Police brutality remains another impediment to meaningful institutional change as a result of anti-hate measures. There exists a long
and well documented history of police violence against target communities. 50° Indeed, the urban riots of the 1960s were sparked by police
violence.s The gay and lesbian liberation movement originated in
the 1969 Stonewall Riot, when patrons of a gay bar fought back
against a police vice raid; such raids were frequently accompanied by
extreme police violence 2 From the perspective of target communities, police remain among the most common perpetrators of bias-motivated violence 53 There is an inherent contradiction, therefore, in
entrusting those same officers with the task of apprehending other
bias offenders5 4
Police brutality represents perhaps the sharpest point of departure between the priorities of target communities and those of the
criminal justice system. Target communities overwhelmingly perceive
250 See Free, supra note 5, at 78-80 (describing deep historical roots of police violence
against African Americans); Hubert G. Locke, The Color of Law and the Issue of Color.
Race and The Abuse of Police Power, in And Justice For Alh Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of Force 133, 135 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1995) (claiming
that "in the 1960s the issue of police use of excessive force was one which polarized police
officials and large segments of the nation's Black populace and civil rights community").
251 See Walker et al., supra note 246, at 85 (describing disproportionate use of police
force against racial minorities and connecting riots in wake of Rodney King verdict to riots
of the 1960s).
252 See generally Martin Duberman, Stonewall (1993) (portraying six gay and lesbian
individuals' experiences during Stonewall period).
253 From 1993-95, nearly half of the anti-Asian cases handled by CAAAV involved police officers as primary offenders. See CAAAV, Police Violence, supra note 101, at 1-10.
Similarly, police were identified as perpetrators in 12% of homophobic offenses nationwide in 1995. See Anti-LesbianlGay Violence in 1995, supra note 22, at 32; see also Beyond Rodney King, supra note 82, at 1-21 (detailing African American perception of police
violence); HIV Manual, supra note 100, at 65-74 (discussing police abuse of HIV-positive
persons); Terry A. Maroney, IHlV and Hatred: Hazardous to Your Health, HealthiPAC
Bulletin, Wmter 1993, at 14, 16-17 (reporting 1992 AVP statistics on violence against persons with HIV, showing that police were perpetrators in 10% of harassment and 24% of
bias assault cases). This is not uniformly true for all types of hate crime. For example,
ADL's audits of anti-Semitic incidents consistently report no police brutality. See, e.g.,
Anti-Defamation League, 1995 Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents (1996) (reporting no instances of police abuse); Anti-Defamation League, 1994 Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents
(1995) (same); Anti-Defamation League, 1993 Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents (1994)
(same).
254 See Interview with Bryan A. Stevenson, supra note 77 (noting such contradiction).
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brutality to be motivated by racism, homophobia, and other biases,255
while police and prosecutors do not.256 For example, African Americans and their allies took it as self-evident that Rodney King would
not have been beaten so brutally had he been white. The white police
officers and a white jury regarded the beating as an individual occurrence justified by King's behavior.257 Similarly, after the recent assault on a black Haitian immigrant, Abner Louima, by a white New
York City police officer,5 8 New York's Caribbean community and its
allies perceived the assault to be a racist attack exemplifying a general
police attitude; the community mobilized outrage and channeled that
outrage into enormous marches and rallies.25 9 Government leadership scrambled to dampen this outrage by insisting that the incident
was isolated 260 and by assembling a police-community relations board
whose effectiveness has been widely questioned. 261 These prominent
examples illustrate a less visible problem.
The existence of police-community boards, bias reporting procedures, and bias units within police departments might encourage
greater discipline of officers who themselves display biased behavior,
255 See Felicia R. Lee, Young and in Fear of the Police: Parents Teach Children How to
Deal with Officers' Bias, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1997, at B1 (describing African American
and Latino parents' perception that their children are at high risk of police mistreatment
based on race, and citing poll showing 82% of African Americans and 71% of Latinos
believe police discriminate while only 45% of whites perceive police racism).
256 See Hernandez, supra note 14, at 852 n.34 (quoting scholar describing prosecutorial
complicity in covering up police-perpetrated bias incidents as example of how prosecutors'
allegiance lies with police with whom they must cooperate).
257 See Locke, supra note 250, at 145-48 (discussing, in wake of King verdict, radically
different views of police and people of color regarding acceptable use of force, including
officers' views that level of force was justified by King's behavior).
258 See David Kocieniewski, Injured Man Says Brooklyn Officers Tortured Him in Custody, N.Y. Tunes, Aug. 13, 1997, at B1 (describing Abner Louima's allegations that police
beat and sexually assaulted him).
259 See Jonathan P. Hicks, Protest Call: 'Something Has to Be Done,' N.Y. Times, Aug.
14, 1997, at B3 (reporting on overwhelming Haitian community concern and anger over
Louima attack); John Kifner, Thousands Call on City Hall To Confront Police Brutality,
N.Y. Tunes, Aug. 30, 1997, at Al (describing march across Brooklyn Bridge to City Hall by
thousands of protesters).
260 See Michael Cooper, Safir, Under Council Fire, Defends Police's Conduct, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 12, 1997, at B3 (reporting that Police Commissioner answered "harsh questioning" from City Council by calling conduct of Louima's attackers "aberrant and
abnormal").
261 See David Firestone, Skepticism and Fiery Debate Mark First Session of Panel, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 22, 1997, at B3 (noting that Mayor Rudolph Giuliani formed task force after
Louima incident and discussing task force's mandate; reporting that some task force members and at least one City Council member feared task force would be no more than public
relations hoax); Jennifer Gonnerman, Missing In Action: Critics Charge No-Shows and
Poor Outreach Undercut the Mayor's Post-Louima Task Force, Village Voice, Dec. 16,
1997, at 52 (reporting that participation by many task force members and community is
low, and citing task force members' frustration with its ineffectiveness).
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as that behavior stands in contrast to the expressed policy of the department. Unfortunately, this has not happened. Police brutality
against people of color, immigrants, gay men and lesbians, and other
target groups does not appear to be lessening; if anything, it appears
to be increasing 5 2 While the few instances in which off-duty police
officers commit hate crimes generally are given media attention and
treated seriously,2 3 hate crimes by police are almost always committed in the course of their duties. Such crimes are funneled through

internal disciplinary mechanisms that are notoriously slow, ineffective,
and biased against victimsZ- 4 The existence of anti-bias policies appears to have little or no effect on brutality rates, making clear that
institutionalized anti-hate measures do not necessarily affect the institutions in which they reside.2

5. Death Penalty
The inability to counteract police brutality adequately demonstrates how institutionalization frustrates the anti-hate-crime movement's goals. The invocation of anti-hate rationales to justify
executions suggests that those measures have in some instances become completely disconnected from, and even antithetical to, the
goals and needs of target communities. In several states, a convicted
262 See CAAAV, Police Violence, supra note 101, at 4-11 (describing annual increase in
reports of police violence against Asians); Beyond Rodney King, supra note 82, at 7-8
(claming that although it is impossible to document whether police violence is increasing,
police-community relations are eroding, and most Americans believe that police brutality
is both common and disproportionately directed at minorities); Beating the Cops: Brutality Claims Denude City Coffers of $98 Million, Village Voice, Dec. 23, 1997, at 35, 38
(reporting that in 1997, 2735 civil misconduct and brutality claims were filed against New
York City police, up from 1567 in 1993); Tough Cops, Thin Skin, N.Y. Tunes, Nov. 22,1997,
at A14 (criticizing New York police and noting that, while complaints apparently began to
drop in 1997, between 1993 and 1996 such complaints rose sharply from 3956 to 5596 annually); Selwyn Raab, City's Police Brutality Report Card: Complaints Down, Needs Improving, N.Y. Times, Aug.17, 1997, at 41 (reporting that in 1996, 80% of New York City
police misconduct complaints were filed by Blacks, Latinos, and Asians).
263 See, e.g., Elsa Brenner, Murder Case Draws 'ies to Bias and the Police, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 28, 1997, Westchester Section, at I (reporting on murder charges against white New
York City off-duty officer who shot black man while yelling racial epithets, and on guilty
plea by white Yonkers off-duty officer who committed bias-motivated assault against black
man).
264 See Beyond Rodney King, supra note 82, at 52-70 (reporting that nationwide, citizens seldom prevail in complaints against police, are dissatisfied with complaint procedures, and are actively discouraged from filing complaints); Michael Cooper, Mayor to
Help Police Monitor He Had Fought, N.Y. Tunes, Sept. 17,1997, at B1 (reporting that of
20,000 police misconduct complaints filed in New York City between 1993 and 1997, only
4% were deemed substantiated and 1%led to discipline of officers).
265 See Anti-Lesbian/Gay Violence in 1995, supra note 13, at 52-53 (citing study showing
that nationally, 9% of homophobic violence victims described police response as "verbally
or physically abusive").
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murderer who otherwise would not be a candidate for execution may
now become "death-eligible" by virtue of having committed a hate
crime. California, 2 66 Delaware, 267 and Nevada 268 explicitly include

commission of a hate crime in their death aggravation schemes. The
inclusion of hate crime in death aggravation schemes and the imposition of death against hate criminals are intended as symbolic gestures
to show target communities that they are valued by society and that
crimes against them are taken seriously. Indeed, using the death penalty as a method of symbolizing societal commitment to defined
groups of people is increasingly common. 2 69 Numerous capital mur-

der schemes, reformulated after Furman v. Georgia2 70 and validated
by Gregg v. Georgia,271 allow the death penalty to be imposed if the
victim was a law enforcement official, 272 a child,2 73 elderly, 274 disabled, 275 or pregnant.2 7 6

The inclusion of hate crime in execution schemes cannot, however, alter the fundamental reality that imposition of the death penalty consistently reinforces a societal valuation of life that is decidedly
tipped against target communities. Death is imposed most frequently
in cases with white victims and black perpetrators, and least fre266 See Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.2(a)(16) (West Supp. 1998) (allowing finding of special circumstances warranting death penalty if "victim was intentionally killed because of
his or her race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin"). This provision was added
to the death penalty statute by popular vote in 1990. See id. Historical and Statutory Notes
(West Supp. 1998).
267 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(v) (1995) (establishing aggravating factor if
"murder was committed... because of the victim's race, religion, color, disability, national
origin or ancestry").
268 See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(11) (1995) (making defendant death-eligible if murder
committed "upon a person because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national
origin, physical or mental disability or sexual orientation of that person").
269 See generally Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of our Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties (1997) (unpublished manuscript,

on file with the New York University Law Review).

270 408 U.S. 238, 403-05 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with per curiam
majority opinion that held two death sentences unconstitutional; inviting states to reformulate their own capital punishment statutes).
271 428 U.S. 153, 196-99 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of reformulated death penalty statute; citing with approval Georgia's use of statutory aggravating factors as guide on
jury discretion and effective means to narrow class subject to capital punishment).
272 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-30(5), (8) (1997) (establishing that murder of judicial officer, district attorney, or peace officer is aggravating factor).
273 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a)(15) (1994) (authorizing death penalty if murder
victim is under 14 years of age); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(10) (1995) (same).
274 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(r) (1995) (authorizing death penalty if
murder victim is over 62 years of age).
275 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(q) (1995) (authorizing death penalty if
murder victim is severely disabled).
276 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(p) (1995) (authorizing death penalty if
murder victim is pregnant).
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quently in cases with black victims and white perpetrators.2n Other
target groups similarly suffer from disproportionate imposition of
death. A recent survey of women on death row, for example, suggested that nearly half are lesbians,278 though by any measure lesbians
account for far less than fifty percent of the female population.V 9 Inclusion of favored victim groups in aggravation schemes has served
merely to expand the number of death-eligible cases, while maintaining bias-motivated disparities in imposition.2 0 The occasional execution of a hate criminal will not alter this overwhelming trend. In fact,
given the danger of disproportionate hate crime prosecution of target
community members, 1 inclusion of hate crime in aggravation
schemes could further the biased imposition of death.3
A preliminary review of death sentencing in cases of hate-motivated murder suggests its biased and uneven imposition. Several people have already been sentenced to death for hate-motivated crimes
even absent statutory designation of hate motivation as an aggravating
factor. In Alabama, Henry Hays became in 1997 the third white person in recent history to be executed for murdering an African American.m Hays, a member of the Ku Klux Klan, had lynched a young
Richard Snell-a right-wing militia member
black man in 1981.
who had killed both a black state trooper and a merchant he mistakenly thought to be Jewish, and who was sentenced to die for the latter
277 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates
Pattern of Racial Disparities 6 (1990) (finding that despite "race-neutral" laws, those convicted of murdering whites are most frequent recipients of death penalty, while those convicted of murdering blacks are least likely to be sentenced to death).
278 See Victoria Brownworth, Dykes on Death Row, Advocate, June 16, 1992, at 62-64
(finding that at least 17 of 41 women on death row were lesbians).
279 See The Information Please Women's Sourcebook 342 (Lisa DiMona & Constance
Herndon eds., 1994) (citing 1993 study showing 2.1% of women identified themselves as
lesbian and 3.1% as bisexual, while 17% of women reported having had lesbian sex).
280 See Interview with Bryan A. Stevenson, supra note 77 (criticizing steady expansion
of death-eligible crimes and persistence of racially biased imposition of death).
281 See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing danger of such disproportionate prosecution).
282 See Jacobs & Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 316) ("It would certainly be ironic if
the consequence of the importation of the civil rights paradigm into criminal law was the
execution of prejudiced murderers, some percentage of whom would be blacks and members of other minority groups.").
283 See Gita M. Smith, Alabama case showed how father's sins were visited on son;
White's execution for killing black didn't end inherited racism, Atlanta J. & Const., June 8,
1997, at 4A (reporting Hays execution); Telephone Interview with Richard C. Dieter, Executive Director, Death Penalty Information Center (Jan. 8, 1998) (reporting that Donald
Gaskins, executed in 1991 for killing black fellow inmate, was first white to die for killing
African American since death penalty had been reinstated in 1976, while Kermit Smith,
executed in 1995 for killing black female college student, was second).
284 See Smith, supra note 283 (reporting murder of Mobile, Alabama teenager Michael
Donald).
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crime-was executed on April 19, 1995.285 A Texas murderer who
admitted killing his victim because he was gay, thinking that he could
thereby avoid prosecution, was sentenced to be executed, as was his
accomplice,

86

A serial hate crime perpetrator, Joseph Paul Franklin,

received a death sentence in 1997 for an anti-Semitic murder commit287
ted twenty years earlier.
Countless other hate-motivated murders, however, have not received death sentences, particularly where the victims were African
American. While Joseph Paul Franklin was sentenced to die for an
anti-Semitic murder, he had earlier received life sentences for fatally
shooting two black Utah men who had been jogging with white
women and for murdering an interracial couple in Missouri. 8 8 African American leaders have noted bitterly that while Franklin was sentenced to life for the Utah murders, a black Utah man was given a
death sentence in a murder he did not personally commit, in which the
victims were white. 289 Several U.S. Marines convicted of the premeditated racist murder of a black North Carolina couple were given life
285 See Jo Thomas & Ronald Smothers, Oklahoma City Building Was Target of Plot as
Early as '83, Official Says, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1995, at 6 (reporting Snell's execution and
noting militia members' interest in his case).
286 See Licensed to Kill (Arthur Dong & DeepFocus Productions 1997) (portraying interviews with Donald Aldrich, sentenced to death for homophobic murder, who told police
of anti-homosexual motivation assuming that such admission would lead to leniency); Gay
Killing Draws 2nd Death Penalty: Second Defendant Faces Death over 1993 Slaying of
Homosexual Tyler Records Clerk, The Austin Am.-Statesman, Sept. 9, 1995, at Bl (reporting that Henry Earl Dunn, Jr., was sentenced to death for homophobic murder and
that Donald Aldrich was sentenced to die in 1994 for same crime).
287 See Kim Bell, Racist Killer Confesses to Three More Slayings, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 10, 1997, at 15A (reporting that Franklin was sentenced to death for 1977 murder and confessed to additional racist murders); Larry Flynt's Assailant Has Left a Tail of
Bigotry and Murder, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1997, at 41 (detailing Franklin's numerous convictions for hate crimes and reporting that judge was expected to impose death sentence as
recommended by jury for 1977 anti-Semitic murder outside St. Louis, Missouri).
288 See Larry Flynt's Assailant Has Left a Trail of Bigotry and Murder, supra note 287
(detailing those crimes and sentences imposed). Additionally, Franklin's conviction for
bombing a synagogue was overturned, see id. (discussing overturned conviction for bombing Chattanooga, Tennessee synagogue in 1977); he was acquitted of shooting a black civil
rights leader, see id. (reporting Franklin's acquittal for nonfatal shooting of Vernon E.
Jordan, Jr., of the National Urban League); and he has confessed to racist murders that
were never charged, see Bell, supra note 287 (claiming that Franklin confessed to murders
of two black Georgia men and killing of white Tennessee woman who had slept with black
man).
289 See Steve Hawkins, Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Letter to the Editor, Utah Shows Death Penalty's Racism, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1992, at
A20 (contrasting death sentence imposed on black defendant, William Andrews, in connection with murder he did not personally commit, with life sentences given to white murderers such as Franklin, and drawing attention to Utah's racially discriminatory record of
death penalty sentencing); Robert Reinhold, Salt Lake City Journal: 1974 Case Still
Strains Race Relations in Utah, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1989, at A16 (reporting that Utah
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sentences. 290 Federal prosecutors declined to seek the death penalty
for three young white men who, as part of an attempt to "start a race

war," shot three African Americans, killing one.291 These cases suggest that the imposition of death in hate crime cases seems to reflect
the same arbitrariness plaguing death sentencing generally. One
scholar has also pointed out that, by executing selected hate criminals
with extremist views, states may attempt to deflect attention from
state sanctioned oppression of target communities; for example, while
Alabama can point to its execution of Henry Hays for a racist murder,
three quarters of those on that state's death row are African
292

American.
More information on the imposition of death against bias-motivated murderers is needed. This first look, however, suggests that the
same biases that plague death sentencing generally also plague hate
crime sentencing.
The inclusion of hate crime in death penalty schemes and the execution of hate criminals is perhaps the clearest indication that antihate-crime measures are no longer under the control of the movement
that pushed for them. Civil rights advocates have never lobbied for
inclusion in aggravation schemes; indeed, they consistently have opposed the death penalty in all circumstances 2 93 While many victims'
rights advocates have supported both the death penalty and recognition of favored victim groups,2 94 they have never done so on behalf of
black leaders believed racism was behind death sentencing of Andrews and life sentencing
of Franklin).
290 See Second Ex-Paratrooper Gets Life In North Carolina Racial Killings, N.Y. Tunes,
May 13, 1997, at A17 (reporting that two white supremacist former paratroopers were
spared death penalty by jury after convictions for racially-motivated murder of black

couple).

See 3 Accused of Race-War Shootings Face Trial, N.Y. Tunes, Nov. 6, 1995, at A18
(reporting that prosecutors originally intended to seek death penalty and later decided
against doing so, and detailing how accused planned to incite war with ultimate goal of
"killing and eliminating blacks").
292 See Telephone Interview with Bryan A. Stevenson, Executive Director, Equal Justice Initiative (Jan. 8, 1998).
293 See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 497 (1987) (noting that NAACP filed
amicus curiae opposing allowance of victim impact statements at capital sentencing);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (noting amicus brief filed by NAACP urging
reversal of death penalty statute); Greenberg, supra note 36, at 440-60 (describing NAACP
LDF fight against capital punishment); id. at 454 (asserting that in early 1980s "LDF lawyers were counsel, or consulted, in every Supreme Court case" dealing with death penalty).
294 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 810-11 (1991) (noting amicus briefs filed
by Frank Carrington, prominent victim advocate, and National Organization for Victim
Assistance, both urging that victim impact information be allowed at capital sentencing);
id. at 834 (Scalia, J. concurring) (citing rise of "victims' rights" movement as one justification for allowing such statements, since not allowing them confounds popular opinion);
Interview with Bryan A. Stevenson, supra note 77 (discussing organized victims' rights
291
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bias victims. An increasingly death oriented criminal justice system
has given target communities a remedy they have not asked for and
which most would not want, 295 but which fits comfortably into the system's own agenda.
In sum, anti-hate-crime measures leave significant opportunities
for the operation of systemic bias. Because such measures have been
rapidly institutionalized, they increasingly have come to reflect the institutional culture and priorities of criminal justice. Consequently,
they are no longer under the control of the communities behind the
anti-hate-crime movement, and are no longer responsive to their
priorities.
B.

Toward a Strong Movement

Anti-hate-crime efforts exist within a general societal context, in
which their positive effects are undercut by popular sentiment and
government actions that adversely affect target communities.2 96 These
broader societal actions speak louder, and affect more people, than do
efforts against hate crime, centered in the few large cities that support
bias units in their police departments and prosecutors' offices. At a
time when the national mood is turning against civil rights claims
made by oppressed groups, anti-hate-crime efforts as they currently
exist are a woefully inadequate counterweight.
groups that have lobbied for expansion of legal bases for and increased imposition of death
penalty).
295 See Smith, supra note 283 (noting that Southern Poverty Law Center, although representing lynching victim's mother in civil suit, was uncomfortable with Hays's execution).
AVP recently issued an official statement opposing the death penalty, in response to the
recent decision by the Kings County District Attorney to seek the death penalty against a
gay man accused of murdering his partner. See New York City Gay and Lesbian AntiViolence Project, Proposed Policy Statement Opposing the Death Penalty (Oct. 11, 1996)
(on file with the New York University Law Review). Additionally, although Donald Aldrich and Henry Earl Dunn, Jr. were sentenced to death for the antigay killing of Nicholas
Ray West in Tyler, Texas, the incident mobilized the Texas gay and lesbian community to
argue for an inclusive state hate crime law rather than to urge the death penalty. See
Power, supra note 117 (describing "Stop the Hate" rally commemorating 1993 murder).
296 The California Attorney General's Commission on Racial, Ethnic, Religious and Minority Violence recognized this danger, recommending that the state increase its general
protections of undocumented immigrants and refugees and take a strong stand against
English-only laws. See California Report, supra note 13, at 67. Undocumented immigrants, the Commission pointed out, are uniquely vulnerable to hate violence when the
public perceives them as a threat to the economy, and exclusionary language laws "point to
the existence of the alienation and fear that cause hate violence." Id.; see also Jacobs &
Potter, supra note 2 (manuscript at 119-21) (discussing long history of violence, beginning
in 1820s, against new immigrants). California is now leading the nation in an attack on
undocumented immigrants. See Proposition 187, approved Nov. 8, 1994, codified at Cal.
Educ. Law §§ 48215,66010.8 (1997) (excluding undocumented immigrants from public elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education).
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The task for anti-hate-crime advocates, therefore, is to make the
movement an adequate counterbalance to the many societal forces
that encourage hate crime and to the institutional forces that prevent
an adequate societal response. The anti-hate-crime movement would
do well to remember that "a social movement does not sustain momentum for long qua social movement if it slips entirely out of the
politics of disorder. If too much emphasis is placed on the use of orthodox channels, the movement becomes mundane, slow moving, and
gradualist.

' 297

By becoming too wedded to the institutions of criminal

justice, the movement loses both its power and its potential.
To resist this trend, the movement must revisit its initial impulse:
to challenge systemic bias against hate crime victims and target communities. Movements may challenge powerful systems consistently
only from a position of internal strength, and the anti-hate-crime
movement today lacks that strength. The movement therefore must
invest in itself. As a preliminary step, the anti-hate-crime movement
must conceptualize itself as a permanent force worth investing in. Too
frequently, movement organizations spring up in the aftermath of a
crisis only to die with the end of that crisis.298 Bearing this cycle in
mind, the criminal justice system's near-exclusive focus on paradigmatic cases 299 may be attributed to the movement itself. Social movements vary in their level of internal organization, ranging from highly
centralized groups to loose coalitions; 300 the anti-hate-crime movement falls on the less organized end of this continuum. With the exception of the few existing grassroots groups that regularly advocate
for "ordinary" victims, the movement tends to make its presence felt
only when an extraordinary case brings people into the streets and
commands media attention.30 1 In such cases the criminal justice system feels compelled to show a sympathetic response. In ordinary
cases, however, no matter how bitterly the victim and her immediate
community may contest a non-bias classification, the criminal justice
system feels no external push to reflect their perceptions. Permanent
organizations can provide that push.
297 Wilson, supra note 30, at 230.

298 See Telephone Interview with Jill IL Trigger, Executive Director, Intergroup
Clearinghouse (Jan. 12, 1998).
299 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing disproportionate focus on such cases to detriment
of fair consideration of mixed-motive cases).
300 See Tarrow, supra note 27, at 15 (positing that many movements have no formal
structure or clear membership and are often in formation at time of public appearance);
Wood & Jackson, supra note 26, at 3-6 (arguing that internal organization of movements
ranges from highly formal to loosely knit).
301 See Telephone Interview with Jill R. Trigger, supra note 298.
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Permanent organizations are needed at both the grassroots and
national levels. Grassroots organizations are perhaps most capable of
reaching victims and their communities, meeting their needs, and
channeling their energies. The few such organizations that currently
exist, however, primarily serve lesbian and gay communities. 302 Many
more such groups, which could be modeled after those highly successful projects, are desperately needed to reach the many communities
affected by hate crime, especially African Americans. Movement
leadership on the regional and national levels is also sorely lacking.
Gay and lesbian projects recently have founded their own national
network, facilitating the sharing of skills and resources.303 Similar networks should be put in place to bring together all communities committed to a common strategy against hate crime.
Before such networks could be successful, anti-hate-crime advocates would have to make a serious commitment to bridging the many
differences that now divide target communities. Most movement organizations focus on specific target communities and have little contact with groups serving other communities.3 04 While such groups
come together on occasion in coalitions, such coalitions typically are
short-lived, being organized in response to a particular crisis or to advocate for passage of a hate crime law.30 5 Even within such coalitions,
advocates have disagreed as to the proper scope of their activities. 306
Such conflicts reflect the fact that target communities, far from enjoying a natural solidarity, may in fact harbor biases against one another.30 7 Indeed, target communities may be implicated in each
302

See id.

See Anti-Gay/Lesbian Violence in 1995, supra note 13, at 6 (discussing formation of
National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs).
304 See Telephone Interview with Jill R. Trigger, supra note 298 (noting that Intergroup
Clearinghouse is one of nation's only anti-hate-crime groups to serve all target
communities).
303

305

See id.

306 For example, while antigay violence is a pervasive and serious problem, see, e.g.,
Hate Crimes: Confronting Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men (Gregory M. Herek &
Kevin T. Berrill eds., 1992) (collecting reports of empirical data, anecdotal essays, and
theoretical papers on violence against lesbians and gay men), not all groups include sexual
orientation under their purview; the same is true of violence against the disabled, immigrant groups, and women, see, e.g., Maryland Report, supra note 88, at 4-5 (describing
mission of NIAPV as being limited to examining ethnic, racial, and religious violence);
Jenness & Broad, supra note 23, at 141-44 (decrying exclusion of violence against women
from agenda of most anti-hate groups); supra note 162 and accompanying text (detailing
contentious battle over proper level of inclusion of gender and other biases in proposed
New York State hate crime bill).
307 See, e.g., Rhonda Chriss Lokeman, Civil Rights Champion Practices What He
Preaches, Kan. City Star, Jan. 12, 1993, at B5 (praising black leader Rev. C.T. Vivian for
inclusion of gays and lesbians in anti-hate agenda and criticizing homophobia of local black
clergy and residents urging their exclusion).
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others' victimization, as when-to give but one example-African
Americans are responsible for anti-Asian violence. 3 0s Anti-hatecrime movement organizations, therefore, may come into sharp conflict with one another; the ADL and the NAACP, for example, reportedly have clashed over the issue of anti-Semitism within the Nation of
Islam. 309 Finally, victims' rights and civil rights groups continue to
maintain their distance from one another, lessening their ability to organize around issues of joint concern 310
The movement must reject this divisiveness and concentrate on
identifying and fortifying common ground. This will entail the often
unpleasant and painful process of confronting the ways in which communities are implicated in each other's victimization and working
through the many conflicts between victims' rights and civil rights
models. While soul searching and confrontation are difficult, they are
indispensable if the movement hopes to work toward internal
strength. From a place of strength, the movement could begin to focus on currently unanswered crucial questions, such as the movement's theory of punishment, the proper balance between
rehabilitation and incarceration, and strategies for reducing police
bias violence.
Finally, the anti-hate-crime movement must refuse to allow governmental authorities to regard anti-hate efforts as severable from
other civil rights demands. Because hate crime is intimately connected with social and political subordination, advocates must refuse
to accept anti-hate measures as a substitute for real systemic change
designed to create equal access to jobs, housing, wealth, education,
services, and personal freedoms. The movement must remember that,
it if hopes to be truly transformative, it must remain true to its rootsthe target communities-whose need to be free from hate crime is
inseparable from the more general need to be free.

308 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Hate Crime Statistics 1995, at 12 (1996) (cataloguing 57 black-onAsian hate crimes).
309 See Peter Noel, Mutual Contempt: The Secret Relationship Between Abraham
Foxman and Benjamin Chavis, Village Voice, Nov. 11, 1997, at 48 (reporting such conflict).
310 Consider that while the New York State Hate Crimes Coalition counts among its

members numerous victims' groups, those groups have been relatively inactive. See Interview with Howie Katz, supra note 91. This disparity in the involvement of victim's groups
as compared to civil rights groups is reflected in the makeup of the Nebraska Hate Crimes
Coalition, which includes ADI, the Urban League of Nebraska, the Chicano Awareness
Center, and the National Conference of Christians and Jews, but no victims' groups. See

R. George Smith, Coalition to Target Hate Crimes, Omaha World-Herald, Jan. 15,1997, at
17 (describing formation and goals of newly formed Nebraska Hate Crimes Coalition).
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CONCLUSION

This Note has explained the recent national explosion in antihate-crime measures by tracing the emergence of an anti-hate-crime
movement. It has grounded that movement's emergence in the political opportunities and cultural understandings created by civil and victims' rights advocates. Given those political opportunities, the
movement experienced a rapid rate of institutionalization. That institutionalization, however, impedes significant change within the institutions of criminal justice, the very system that movement hopes to
change. By citing specific examples of the continuing maltreatment of
bias victims, and by calling attention to the persistence of police brutality and the lack of control movement advocates now have over antihate measures and their implementation, this Note has read failure
into success.
The proper response to this failure is not to abandon the effort.
To the contrary, this Note is a call to further action. By investing in
itself and moving toward a position of internal strength, the anti-hatecrime movement may fortify itself to resist the pull toward systemic
demands and instead assert the demands of outsider communities.
Movements, after all, lay the groundwork for future movements; it is
therefore appropriate to consider the legacy this movement wants to
create.31 ' The anti-hate-crime movement could fade away and leave
behind a governmental infrastructure of police reporting mechanisms,
bias units, and hate crime laws that could fall into disuse or be used
against the persons who advocated for them. By contrast, with
enough commitment, it may become both a permanent source of mobilization for those who want to make systems of governance accountable to target communities and a mechanism by which those
communities might learn to work productively with one another.

311 See Tarrow, supra note 27, at 172 (pointing out that movements have potential to
"transform their initial challenges into permanent access to power and leave lasting networks of activists behind").
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